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Abstract
Despite the wide range of agendas used in legislative decision-making, the literature has focused almost exclusively
on two stylized formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. As emphasized by Ordeshook and
Schwartz [1987], this focus leaves a sizable gap in our understanding of the legislative process.
To help address the deficiency, I first define a very broad class of agendas (called simple agendas) whose features
are common among agendas used in legislative settings. I then characterize the sophisticated (Farquharson [1969])
voting outcomes implemented by agendas in this class. By establishing a clear connection between the structure of
simple agendas and the outcomes associated with them, the characterization extends our understanding of legislative
decision-making well beyond the very limited scope of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D02; D71; D72.
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1 Introduction
Agenda voting provides a straightforward way to make a group decision. By majority voting on the sequence of
“aye” (yes) or “nay” (no) questions set out by the agenda, the group can whittle down the issue gradually; and,
ultimately, arrive at a consensus. In legislative settings, almost every issue is decided by agenda; and, a wide
range of agenda formats are used (Black [1948, 1958]; Riker [1958]; Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987]; Miller
[1995]). Yet, the literature has focused almost exclusively on two stylized formats, the Euro-Latin and Anglo-
American agendas (Miller [1977, 1980]; Shepsle and Weingast [1984]; Banks [1985]; Rasch [2000]; Apesteguia,
Ballester, and Masatlioglu [2014]; Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi [2015]; Barberà and Gerber [2016]).1
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1These two agendas are named for their relative prominence in the Euro-Latin and Anglo-American legal traditions. Following
Farquharson [1969], some of the cited papers adopt a different nomenclature: Euro-Latin agendas are called successive agendas;
and, Anglo-American agendas are called amendment agendas.
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As emphasized by Ordeshook and Schwartz, the focus on Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas leaves
a significant gap in our understanding of legislative decision-making. These formats are not as prevalent as
their place in the literature suggests; and, they can lead to outcomes which are quite different from other
agendas used in practice. These observations are troubling. Legislative decision-making plays a crucial role in
the behavior of political actors and policy makers; and, without a clear picture of this basic institution, one
cannot begin to address some of the most basic questions in political economy and public economics.
The goal of this paper is to extend our understanding of strategic voting behavior (called sophisticated
voting by Farquharson [1969]) to a much broader range of legislative agendas beyond Euro-Latin and Anglo-
America agendas. To do so, I define a new class of agendas, called simple agendas, whose structural features
are prevalent among agendas used in practice. I also define a special sub-class, called priority agendas, whose
sequential structure is most closely related to Euro-Latin and Anglo-America agendas.
To get a better sense of these agenda classes, recall that an agenda is a sequence of questions to be decided
by simple majority voting. Formally, this corresponds to a binary game tree where each stage game involves
a vote between “aye” and “nay” options. Figure 1 illustrates the questions (top) and game trees (bottom)
associated with the Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas on three alternatives.
Q1. Should x1 be accepted?
Q2. If not, should x2 be accepted?
Q1. Should x2 be eliminated over x1?
Q2. Should x3 be eliminated over the “winner” of Q1.?
{x1, x2, x3}
x1
aye
{x2, x3}
x2
aye
x3
nay
nay
{x1, x2, x3}
{x1, x3}
x1
aye
x3
nay
aye
{x2, x3}
x2
aye
x3
nay
nay
Figure 1: Left: a Euro-Latin agenda on three alternatives. Right: an Anglo-American agenda on three alternatives.
For a Euro-Latin agenda (left), the voting is by sequential majority approval : the voters consider one
alternative in each stage. Ultimately, the alternative selected is the first one to be approved by majority. In
contrast, the voting for an Anglo-American agenda (right) is by sequential majority comparison: the voters
compare two alternatives in each stage with the “loser” being eliminated and the “winner” moving on to the
next comparison. Ultimately, the alternative selected is the only one which survives this process.
Despite their differences, these agendas share the same kind of structure. Both can be built using a priority
ordering which specifies when to add each alternative to the agenda;2 and, an amendment rule which specifies
how to add each alternative.3 For both agendas in Figure 1, x1 is the first alternative added to the agenda, x2
2The priority is not intended to capture the temporal order in which motions are proposed. As illustrated by Figure 3, the
agenda may be backwards-built, a practice which is relatively common in the Anglo-American legal tradition (see Miller [1995]).
3Whether it involves a perfecting amendment, a second-order amendment, or a substitute affects how the alternative is added.
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the second, and x3 the third. The difference is the amendment rule: on the Euro-Latin agenda, the alternative
x3 can only ever face x2; and, on the Anglo-American agenda, it can face x1 or x2.
These amendment rules are straightforward to generalize to longer agendas: for a Euro-Latin agenda, each
new addition only faces the last alternative added to the agenda; and, for an Anglo-American agenda, it faces
every alternative previously added to the agenda. Figure 2 illustrates how each agenda in Figure 1 is extended
when a fourth alternative (x4) is added.4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
x1 {x2, x3, x4}
x2 {x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
Figure 2: Extensions of the agendas in Figure 1. Left: a Euro-Latin agenda. Right: an Anglo-American agenda.
Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas have the feature that the same kind of amendment occurs at
each stage. One way to expand the set of agendas is to allow for a mix of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American
amendments. Figure 3 illustrates two such “hybrid” agendas (as they are called by Ordeshook and Schwartz).
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x1 {x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
x2 {x3, x4}
x3 x4
Figure 3: Hybrid extensions of the agendas in Figure 1. Left: a Euro-Latin agenda extended by adding x4 via Anglo-
American amendment. Right: an Anglo-American agenda extended by adding x4 via Euro-Latin amendment.
Priority agendas generalize the “mixed” structure of the hybrid agendas in Figure 3. Like Euro-Latin and
Anglo-American agendas, they are defined by a priority ordering and an amendment rule. The difference is that
they allow for a much wider range of amendments: a new addition z to the agenda can face any alternative
y that is already on the agenda — provided that it faces every alternative that was added between y and z .
Because of their flexible structure, priority agendas include a wide variety of agendas used in practice.
4To avoid clutter, I omit the edge labels. Instead, I adopt the convention that left means “aye” and right means “nay”.
3
To illustrate, suppose that a bill b is put up for consideration; and, subsequently, two amendments a′ and
a′′ to b are proposed. If the two amendments are incompatible (in the sense that both cannot be applied to b
simultaneously), then Congressional procedure could result in the following sequence of questions (see Figure
2 of Schwartz [2008]; or, Figure 5 of Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987]):
Q1. Should the first amendment a′ be accepted?
Q2. If not, should the second amendment a′′ be accepted?
Q3. Should the bill as amended be selected over the status quo?
This corresponds to the left-hand agenda in Figure 3 where: x4 is the status quo legislation; x3 the original bill
b; x2 the bill amended by a′′; and, x1 the bill amended by a′. Effectively, this agenda uses Euro-Latin voting to
determine which version of the bill (x1, x2, or x3) is put to a final up or down vote.
A very different approach would be to first decide on recognizing just one of the amendments (by way of a
preliminary motion); and, then use Euro-Latin voting to decide among the remaining legislative options:
Q1. Should the amendment a′ be recognized over the amendment a′′?
Q2. Should the bill as amended (by the “winner” of Q1.) be accepted?
Q3. If not, should the original bill be accepted?
It is not difficult to see that this sequence of questions corresponds to the right-hand agenda in Figure 3.
Despite their flexibility, priority agendas rule out a variety of agendas used in practice. To illustrate, suppose
instead that a′ and a′′ are compatible. Then, Congressional procedure requires an up or down vote on a′ before
a′′ can be recognized (see Figure 3 of Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987]). This leads to the agenda in Figure 4.
Q1. Should the first amendment a′ be accepted?
Q2. Should the second amendment a′′ be accepted?
Q3. Should the bill as amended be selected over the status quo?
{x0, x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x0, x1, x4}
{x0, x4}
x0 x4
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
Figure 4: A two-period Congressional agenda.
Compared with the left-hand agenda in Figure 3, the only difference (which stems from Q2.) is the addition
of the bill b as amended by a′ and a′′. In Figure 4, this “doubly amended” bill is represented by x0. Despite its
close relationship to the left-hand agenda in Figure 3, the two-period Congressional agenda in Figure 4 is not
a priority agenda. Intuitively, the problem is that the symmetric structure of the agenda cannot be reconciled
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with the existence of a priority ordering among the alternatives in {x1, ..., x4}.
To accommodate this agenda (and many others), I set aside the procedure used to build agendas; and,
instead concentrate on their structural features. The simple agendas that I consider are defined by two features:
history-independence, which stipulates that the question posed can only depend on the alternatives not yet
eliminated from consideration; and, persistence, which requires that the “safe” alternatives (which do not risk
elimination) for a given question must be tested as a group by one of the subsequent questions.5
Both features appear to be common in practice. Among the legislative agendas discussed in the literature,
the only ones which violate history-independence involve procedural motions that do not eliminate anything from
consideration; and, the only ones which violate persistence involve substitute amendments. Stated in terms
of the taxonomy introduced by Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987], the procedural questions make an agenda
repetitive; and, the substitute amendments make it discontinuous. In the result, the class of simple agendas
appears to include almost all agendas dealing with substantive issues — with the exception of discontinuous
agendas like the two-stage amendment agendas used in Congress (as in Example 9 of the Supplementary
Appendix; the paper by Banks [1989]; or, Figure 2 of Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987]).
1.1 Results
While a contribution in itself, the definition of these agenda classes is only the first step of the analysis. The
main contribution is to characterize what decision rules can be implemented by simple agendas and priority
agendas, respectively: as the voters’ preferences or the alternatives change, how must the sophisticated outcome
change? The point is to clarify how the structure of an agenda relates to its voting outcomes.
A secondary contribution (made possible by the main results) is to compare the sophisticated outcomes for
simple agendas and priority agendas to some other agenda classes — namely the broader class of non-repetitive
and continuous agendas; and, the narrower classes of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. Here, the point
is to clarify how the scope of outcomes changes as the range of agendas expands.
Before turning to the related literature, I briefly describe these two contributions in greater detail.
Implementation: In Section 3, I first show that two natural conditions, Issue Splitting and the Independence
of Losing Alternatives, characterize sophisticated voting on simple agendas (Theorem 1). The first weakens
Path Independence (Plott [1973]). It stipulates that the outcome can always be determined by splitting the
decision problem into a pair of sub-issues.6 In turn, the second condition weakens the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives7 (Chernoff [1954]; Radner and Marschak [1954]). It states that the removal of an alternative with
no majority appeal (known as the Condorcet loser) cannot affect the outcome.8
In Section 5, I show that sophisticated voting on the narrower class of priority agendas satisfies a Marginal-
ization property known to hold for Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas (Proposition 3): there is some
5The agenda in Figure 4 is clearly history-independent (since every node has a unique label). Likewise, it is persistent. To see
this, note that x4 is the only alternative which is ever safe; but, whenever that is the case, it is tested by a subsequent question.
6It also weakens a condition called Division Consistency (Apesteguia et al. [2014]) or Weak Separability (Xu and Zhou [2007]).
7This “elimination-based” IIA condition was first proposed in the context of individual choice; and, it is formally distinct from
the IIA condition that Arrow [1950] proposed for social choice (Ray [1973]). Having said this, elimination-based independence
conditions have been considered in the context of voting (see e.g., Fishburn [1974]; Young [1995]; and, Ching [1996]).
8Apesteguia et al. [2104] call this condition Condorcet Loser Consistency. That name usually refers to a much weaker property
which stipulates that a Condorcet loser cannot be chosen. To avoid potential confusion, I depart from their nomenclature.
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alternative which is chosen only if it has majority support over every other alternative (Miller [1977]; Moulin
[1991]). (Like Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas, the marginal alternative is the last one added to the
agenda.) Combined with Issue Splitting and the Independence of Losing Alternatives, this Marginalization
property characterizes sophisticated voting on priority agendas (Theorem 2).
Comparison: In Section 4, I show that simple agendas have two appealing properties that distinguish them from
the broader class of non-repetitive and continuous agendas. First, the outcome is unchanged when it improves
in the voters’ preferences (Proposition 1).9 Previously, only knockout and Anglo-American agendas were known
to exhibit this Preference Monotonicity property (Moulin [1986, 1991]; Altman et al. [2009]). Second, the
removal of an alternative yields an agenda which is outcome-equivalent to a simple agenda (Proposition 2).
This Self-Consistency property limits the ability to manipulate an agenda by expanding it.
In Section 6, I show that every property of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas emphasized in the liter-
ature extends to priority agendas. Besides Preference Monotonicity (Proposition 1), Self-Consistency (Proposi-
tion 2), and Marginalization (Proposition 3), priority agendas have the property that the outcome is unchanged
when it moves up in terms of priority (Proposition 4). Previously, this Priority Monotonicity property was only
known to hold for Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas (Moulin [1986, 1991]; Jung [1990]).
Despite these commonalities, there is a natural way to distinguish Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas
from other priority agendas. It is tied to the fact that Euro-Latin agendas are less discriminating than Anglo-
American agendas: while the former can select alternatives throughout the Top Cycle (Miller [1977]), the latter
can only select alternatives from a special subset (identified by Banks [1985]). In fact, the discriminability of
every priority agenda must be somewhere between these two extremes (Proposition 5).
1.2 Related Literature
At one extreme, much of the literature on sophisticated voting contemplates a very narrow range of agendas.
Besides the many papers on Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas (cited above), there is some work on
specialized agendas that arise in the context of legislative voting (Banks [1989]; Miller [1995]; Schwartz [2008]);
or, tournament solutions (Coughlan and Le Breton [1999]; Fischer et al. [2011]; Iglesias et al. [2014]).10
At the other extreme, a small number of papers are concerned with general conditions which are either
necessary (McKelvey and Niemi [1978]; Moulin [1986]; Srivastava and Trick [1996]) or necessary and sufficient
(Horan [2013]) for implementation by agenda. On the whole, the existence results in these papers are non-
constructive. So, while they delimit what outcomes can and cannot be achieved with strategic agenda voting
in general, they are silent about what outcomes can be achieved with a particular agenda.
The current paper bridges the gap between these two strands of the literature — by characterizing the
relationship between“form” and “function” for a wide range of agendas used in legislative settings. Since the
prior work on this issue is quite limited, the main connection to the existing literature is methodological.
In this regard, two papers merit particular emphasis. First and foremost is Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987],
which defines a useful taxonomy of agenda features (later extended by Miller [1995]). While my definition of
9This weakens Strategyproofness (Sanver and Zwicker [2009]) and May’s [1952] Positive Responsiveness (Fishburn [1982]).
10For a nice overview of the vast literature on tournament solutions, see Laslier [1997] or Brandt et al. [2016].
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simple agendas does not rely on the structural features which they identify, it is motivated by a similar desire
to abstract away from institutional details and focus on the structural elements of agendas.
No less important is Apesteguia et al. [2014]. The key innovation of that paper, which I exploit, is to adopt
a decision rule framework to analyze agenda voting.11 Unlike the conventional approach to implementation,
this framework allows both the voter preferences and the set of feasible alternatives to vary. For agendas, it
turns out that this does not enrich the scope of implementable rules (see Remark 1). However, it dramatically
simplifies the statement and the interpretation of the conditions for implementation. As an added benefit, it
also provides a natural setting to study problems, like strategic candidacy and agenda-setting (discussed in
Section 7), that depend on how voting outcomes change when alternatives become unavailable.
2 Definitions
In this section, I review the basic definitions used in the paper.12 There is a finite set N of voters and a finite
universe X of social alternatives. For convenience, I assume that |N| is odd and |N|, |X | ≥ 2. A profile of voter
preferences P ≡ (Pi )i∈N is an |N|-tuple of (linear) orderings Pi over X ; an issue A is a non-empty subset of
X ; and, a decision problem is pair (P,A). Let P denote the collection of all profiles; X the collection of all
(non-empty) issues; and, Xj ≡ {A ∈ X : |A| = j} the sub-collection of issues with cardinality j .
Definition 1 A decision rule is a mapping v : P× X→ X such that v(P,A) ∈ A for all (P,A) ∈ P× X.
In other words, a decision rule prescribes a social outcome for every possible combination of voter preferences
and social alternatives. In the sequel, I study the implementation of decision rules by agenda. Formally:
Definition 2 An agenda TA on A ⊆ X is a finite binary tree such that:
(i) each terminal node is labeled by (a set consisting of) one alternative in A;
(ii) each alternative in A labels one or more terminal nodes; and,
(iii) each non-terminal node is labeled by the set of alternatives that label its two successors.13
An agenda defines a game tree: each terminal node (or outcome) represents a social alternative; and, each
non-terminal node (or stage game) represents a majority vote between the two subgames that follow it. In
legislative settings, each vote relates to a question of policy. By convention, the left subgame represents majority
support for “aye” while the right subgame represents majority support for “nay.” With this interpretation in
mind, the first two features of Definition 2 ensure that: (i) every sequence of questions leads to some social
outcome; and, (ii) every social outcome results from some sequence of questions. In turn, feature (iii) amounts
to a labeling convention: every node is designated by the outcomes that are reachable from it.14
11The Supplementary Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the connection to Apesteguia et al. [2014].
12Whenever possible, I follow the notation used by Apesteguia et al. [2014] (see Section 2 of their paper).
13The Supplementary Appendix gives a primer of the standard graph theory terminology used here and elsewhere in the paper.
14This convention follows the Farquharson-Miller definition rather than the Ordeshook-Schwartz definition (see Schwartz [2008]).
Since my focus is sophisticated rather than sincere voting, the labeling convention plays no role in the analysis. I follow it only
because it simplifies the definition of the agenda classes considered in the sequel.
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To get a sense of these three features, it is worth re-considering Figures 1 to 4 of the Introduction. There,
I abuse notation by omitting the set brackets for the labels of the terminal nodes. In the sequel, I perpetuate
this abuse by omitting the brackets for singleton sets when there is no danger of causing confusion.
To adapt an agenda TX to a sub-issue A ⊂ X , one can prune away all of the terminal nodes labeled by
infeasible alternatives (see Xu and Zhou [2007]; Horan [2011]; and, Bossert and Sprumont [2013]).
Definition 3 Given an agenda TX on X , the pruned agenda TX |A on A ⊆ X is constructed as follows:
(1) First, remove every terminal node of TX that is labeled by an alternative x ∈ X \ A.
(2) Then, remove every node with one successor, connecting its successor to its predecessor.15
(3) Finally, relabel every non-terminal node of the resulting tree to conform with Definition 2.
Like a single-elimination competition in sports, the idea is that the infeasible alternatives (i.e., the alternatives
in X \ A) “forfeit” their position without otherwise modifying the agenda. To illustrate, consider the following
agenda TX on X = {a, a′, b, c, x} and the associated pruned agenda TX |A on A = {b, c, x}:
X
A ∪ a
{a, b}
a b
{c , x}
c x
A ∪ a′
{b, x}
b x
{a′, c}
a′ c
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
pruning the nodes a and a′
A
A
b {c , x}
c x
A
{b, x}
b x
c
Figure 5: Left: an agenda TX . Right: the associated pruned agenda TX |A.
Given an agenda TA, each pair (TA;P) defines a complete information extensive-form game with voter
preferences given by P and outcomes in A. For games like this, the natural solution concept is Farquharson’s
[1969] notion of “sophisticated” voting, which is based on the idea that voters are forward-looking. For this
solution concept, the (unique) equilibrium outcome only depends on the majority relation.
Definition 4 For (P,A) ∈ P× X, the majority relation MPA between alternatives x , y ∈ A is given by:
xMPA y if |{i ∈ N : xPi y}| > |N|/2.
Since |N| is odd, MPA is a total (for distinct x , y ∈ A, xMPA y or yMPA x) and asymmetric (for x , y ∈ A, not
xMPA y and yM
P
A x) binary relation on A. In the literature, such a relation is known as a tournament.
16
15In case the root node (which has no predecessor) has a unique successor, its successor becomes the new root node.
16McGarvey [1953] was the first to consider the problem of finding an upper bound on the minimum number of voters |N| such
that {MPA : P ∈ P} coincides with the set of all tournaments on A. He showed that |N| ≤ |A|2 − |A|. Subsequently, Stearns
[1959] improved the bound to |N| ≤ |A| + 2 for |A| even; and, |N| ≤ |A| + 1 for |A| odd. More recently, Fiol [1992] improved it
to |N| ≤ |A| − blog2 |A|c+ 1 for |A| − blog2 |A|c even; and, |N| ≤ |A| − blog2 |A|c for |A| − blog2 |A|c odd.
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In any vote at the final stage of TA, each voter has a weakly dominant strategy to endorse her preferred
alternative. So, MPA determines which alternative wins a majority in any vote at this stage. When deciding how
to vote in any subgame at the penultimate stage, the forward-looking voters discount the alternatives that lose
at the final stage; and, again perceive the vote as a choice between two alternatives. So, MPA again determines
which option (“yea” or “nay”) wins a majority at this stage. By extending this reasoning back to the root node,
one can use MPA to determine the sophisticated voting outcome of (TA;P).
As shown by McKelvey and Niemi [1978], this “backward induction” reasoning is equivalent to finding the
dominance solvable (Moulin [1979]) or undominated Nash equilibrium outcome of (TA;P).17 To formalize:
Definition 5 For a game (TA;P), the sophisticated voting outcome UNE [TA;P] is defined as follows:
(1) First, define TPA(1) ≡ TA to be the original agenda.
(2) Then, for each j > 1, define the agenda TPA(j + 1) from T
P
A(j) as follows:
- In each terminal subgame of TPA(j), prune away the loser according to M
P
A ; and,
- Relabel the non-terminal nodes of the resulting binary tree to conform with Definition 2.
(3) Finally, define UNE [TA;P] ≡ TPA(K ) where K is the smallest j such that TPA(j) = TPA(j + 1).
Having defined the game form and solution concept, it remains to formalize the notion of implementation:
Definition 6 A decision rule v is implementable by agenda if there exists an agenda TX such that
v(P,A) = UNE [TX |A;P]
for every decision problem (P,A) ∈ P× X. In that case, the agenda TX implements the decision rule v .
Despite appearances, this is no more general than the usual notion of implementation with a fixed issue X .
To see this, consider a decision problem (P,A) and let PA denote a profile that coincides with P on A but, in
each voter preference, places the alternatives in X \A (in a specific order) below every alternative in A. For an
agenda, this “demotion” amounts to the same as “pruning away” the alternatives in X \ A:
Remark 1 If a decision rule v is implementable by agenda, then v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) for all (P,A) ∈ P× X.
Put differently, the sub-issues play no role in the analysis of agenda implementation. Once the agenda-setter
determines what to implement for X , the outcomes for all sub-issues A ⊂ X are pinned down.
3 Simple Agendas
After defining simple agendas, I characterize the family of decision rules implemented by agendas in this class;
and, provide a “recipe” for the unique simple agenda that implements each decision rule in this family.
3.1 Definitions and Examples
Simple agendas are defined by two features. The first stipulates that the label of each node fully determines
the structure of the agenda below. For an agenda TX , let `(q) denote the label of node q. By the convention
17The quotation marks (which I continue to use throughout the paper) serve as a reminder that this is not technically equivalent
to backward induction. The issue is the lack of full information: every stage game involves simultaneous choices by all voters.
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in Definition 2(3), `(q) is the set of outcomes that are reachable from q. Letting q1 and q2 denote the two
successors of a non-terminal node q, the first feature may then be stated as follows:
Feature 1 An agenda is history-independent if, for every pair of non-terminal nodes q and q˜,
`(q) = `(q˜) only if {`(q1), `(q2)} = {`(q˜1), `(q˜2)}.
This condition requires the same question to be posed at any two nodes that ultimately lead to the same set
of potential outcomes. Equivalently, the structure of the agenda below each node q can only depend on the
outcomes that are reachable from q (and not on the history of nodes that led to q).18
In turn, the second feature requires that outcomes are contested in an orderly fashion. Given a non-terminal
node q, let u(q) ≡ `(q1) ∩ `(q2) denote the set of uncontested outcomes (that do not risk elimination) at q;
and, let c(q) ≡ `(q) \ u(q) denote the set of contested outcomes (that do risk elimination) at q. Using these
definitions, the second feature may be stated as follows:
Feature 2 An agenda is persistent if, for every non-terminal node q such that u(q) 6= ∅ and each terminal
node t below q, there exists a non-terminal node qt between q and t such that u(q) ∈ {`(qt1), `(qt2)}.
The idea is that u(q) is an issue that must be addressed before making a final choice. Since q does not engage
this issue, there must be some subsequent question qt that does so for each outcome `(t) below q.
If an agenda is persistent and history-independent, then its structure is particularly simple (see Claim 3 of
the Appendix).19 In that case, the question qt pits u(q) against (an issue that includes) c(q) ∩ `(qt). So,
the question qt either eliminates some of the outcomes uncontested at q; or, all of the remaining outcomes
contested at q. In fact, qt must be the first question after q where any outcome in u(q) is contested. For all
questions between q and qt , the contested outcomes must be ones that were previously contested at q.
Class 1 An agenda is simple if it is both history-independent and persistent.
In the sequel, I denote a simple agenda on A by SA; and, the class of simple agendas (on issues A ∈ X) by
S. This class includes a wide range of agendas used in practice. Some examples will help to illustrate.
Example 1 One important sub-class is the class of knockout (or partition) agendas where each alternative
labels exactly one terminal node. Up to permutation of the alternatives, there are two knockout agendas for
|X | = 4 alternatives: the balanced agenda below (which is sometimes called a Plott-Levine agenda in the
literature); and, the unbalanced (Euro-Latin) agenda in Figure 2.
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x2}
x1 x2
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
18Given the finiteness of the agenda, this implies Farquharson Axiom II: for each non-terminal node q, `(q) 6= `(q1), `(q2).
19Example 12 of the Supplementary Appendix shows that these two features are independent.
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Example 2 Another important sub-class is the class of priority agendas studied in Section 5. For |X | = 3, the
only priority agendas are the Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. For |X | = 4, there are four additional
priority agendas (up to permutation): the two agendas in Figure 3; and, the two agendas below.
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
x1 {x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x1 {x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
Example 3 When |X | = 3, every simple agenda is a knockout agenda or a priority agenda. As the number of
alternatives grows, an increasing variety of simple agendas fall outside these two sub-classes. When |X | = 4,
there are already two such agendas (up to permutation):
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3}
x1 x3
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
x3
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x3}
x2 x3
{x3, x4}
x4 x3
Examples 1-3 describe all of the simple agendas on |X | = 4 alternatives: the six priority agendas; the knockout
agenda in Example 1; and, the two agendas in Example 3. One natural way to build larger agendas from these
nine agendas is through the formation of compound agendas.
Definition 7 Given an agenda TA on A = {a1, ..., am} and a collection of agendas {TaiDi : ai ∈ A} such that
Di ∩A = ai for each i , the compound agenda TA⊗{TaiDi : ai ∈ A} on D ≡
⋃
ai∈A Di is constructed as follows:
(1) First, replace each terminal node of TA labeled by ai ∈ A with the agenda TaiDi .
(2) Then, relabel the non-terminal nodes of the resulting binary tree to conform with Definition 2.
The basic idea is that D \A consists of alternatives that were not up for consideration in TA. Instead of having
to settle on ai ∈ A, the voters have the opportunity to select among the alternatives in Di . To do so, they
follow the agenda TaiDi at any point where they would have otherwise selected ai from TA.
It is clear that the simplicity of the “base” agenda TA and every “extension” T
ai
Di
is necessary but not sufficient
for the resulting compound agenda to be simple. Nonetheless, simplicity is preserved under a variety of natural
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compounding procedures — like the procedure used to extend priority agendas (discussed in Example 8 below);
or, the procedure used to “standardize” an agenda.
Definition 8 An agenda is standard if the last question always involves the status quo alternative x∗. Clearly,
one can “standardize” any agenda TA such that x∗ /∈ A by adding a final question at each terminal node.
Formally, this defines a compound agenda T∗A ≡ TA ⊗ {S{ai ,x∗} : ai ∈ A} on A ∪ x∗.
It is not difficult to see that a standardized agenda is simple if and only if the base agenda is simple. In
fact, many agendas used in practice are standardized simple agendas. The hybrid agenda on the left-hand side
of Figure 3 is a standardized Euro-Latin agenda, for instance. Similarly, the two-period Congressional agenda
in Figure 4 is a standardized Plott-Levine agenda.20 (In both cases, x4 serves as the status quo alternative).
3.2 Implementation
The necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation by simple agenda are natural conditions related to
Path Independence and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
The first condition stipulates that the outcome can be determined by “splitting up” an issue into simpler
issues. A pair (B,C ) ∈ X× X defines a splitting of A ∈ X for a decision rule v if:
(i) B ∪ C = A (so that B and C form an exact bi-cover of A);
(ii) B ∩ C 6= B,C (so that B and C are non-nested sets); and,
(iii) v(P,A) = v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}) for every profile P ∈ P.
When there exists a splitting of A, v is splittable for A. Then, the first condition can be stated as follows:
Issue Splitting (IS) For every issue A /∈ X1, v is splittable.
By comparison, Path Independence imposes a much stronger requirement: the equality in (iii) must hold for
all pairs (B,C ) that (i) form an exact bi-cover of A even when (ii) the sub-issues B and C are nested.21
In turn, the second condition stipulates that outcomes cannot be affected by the presence of a universally
unappealing alternative. An alternative a ∈ A is the Condorcet loser for a decision problem (P,A) ∈ P× X if
xMPA a for all x ∈ A \ a. Then, a decision rule v is independent of the losers for A ∈ X if: for all P ∈ P and
a ∈ A, v(P,A) = v(P,A \ a) if a is the Condorcet loser for (P,A). The second condition requires this kind of
independence for every non-degenerate issue.
Independence of Losing Alternatives (ILA) For every issue A /∈ X1, v is independent of the losers.
By comparison, IIA imposes a much stronger requirement: the removal of any unchosen alternative must not
affect the outcome, regardless of whether this alternative is the Condorcet loser.
20Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987] discuss some related agendas: the agenda in their Figure 14 is a standardized knockout
agenda; and, the agenda in their Figure 5 is a standardized priority agenda (which extends the left-hand agenda in Example 2).
21Likewise, IS weakens Apesteguia et al.’s [2014] Division Consistency. One difference is that condition (ii) does not require
the sub-issues (B,C) of A to be disjoint. Another is that IS does not impose any consistency between the splitting of A and the
splitting of its sub-issues. In particular, it does not require that v(P,D) = v(P, {v(P,B ∩ D), v(P,C ∩ D)}) for all D ⊂ A.
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Together, these two conditions characterize implementation by simple agenda. As shown in Section 3.3
below, the structure of the unique implementing agenda is determined by the outcomes of v for profiles, called
Condorcet triples, where the majority preference relation forms a cycle on three alternatives:
Theorem 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions) A decision rule v is implementable by simple agenda if
and only if it satisfies Issue Splitting and the Independence of Losing Alternatives. (Uniqueness) For every
decision rule v that satisfies these two properties, there is a unique simple agenda SvX that implements v ; and,
the structure of SvX is fully determined by the outcomes on Condorcet triples.
The Supplementary Appendix contains examples showing that IS and ILA are independent. In general, ILA
is necessary for implementation by any kind of agenda (whether or not the agenda in question is simple). This
is a straightforward consequence of Remark 1: “backward induction” is unaffected by pruning the Condorcet
loser away from an agenda. Conversely, IS is not generally necessary for implementation by agenda, as the
following example illustrates. To simplify the presentation, let Pxyz denote a Condorcet triple where x is
majority preferred to y , y to z , and z to x .22
Example 4 The decision rule implemented by the agenda TX in Figure 5 violates IS. To see this, it is enough
to observe that, for the decision problems (Pxbc ,A) and (Pxcb,A), the outcome is the majority winner between
b and c . So, UNE [TX |A;Pxbc ] = b cannot be paired with x in any potential splitting of A. Otherwise, b must
be eliminated by x , which is majority preferred on (Pxbc ,A). By the same reasoning, UNE [TX |A;Pxcb] = c
cannot be paired with x . This leaves (x , {b, c}) as the only potential splitting of A. Since that would require
x as the outcome for both (Pxbc ,A) and (Pxcb,A) however, there can be no way to split A.
3.3 A Recipe
For a decision rule v that satisfies IS and ILA, every issue A /∈ X1 has a unique splitting (see Claim 8 of the
Appendix). This makes it straightforward to define, by recursion, the unique simple agenda that implements
v . To formalize, let S{`1,`2} denote the unique simple agenda with two terminal nodes labeled `1 and `2; and,
let S{`} denote the unique degenerate agenda with a single node labeled `.
Definition 9 Given a decision rule v that satisfies IS and ILA, the agenda SvX is defined as follows:
(1) First, define Sv (1) ≡ S{X} to be the degenerate agenda whose only node is labeled X .
(2) Then, for each j > 1, define the agenda Sv (j + 1) from Sv (j) as follows:
- For each terminal node labeled by a non-singleton A (if any), find the splitting (BA,CA); and,
- Replace every terminal node of Sv (j) labeled by A with the simple agenda S{BA,CA}.
(3) Finally, define SvX ≡ Sv (|X | − 1).
Since the recursion continues for |X | − 1 steps, each terminal node of SvX must be labeled by a singleton. It
follows that SvX defines an agenda. What is more, this agenda is history-independent: at any interim stage, the
22Since |N| ≥ 3, it is guaranteed that such a profile Pxyz exists (see footnote 16 above).
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construction is identical for each terminal node labeled by the issue A. While not immediately apparent from
Definition 9, it turns out that SvX is also persistent (see Claim 9 of the Appendix).
X
BX
...
{x , y}
x y
...
SvX (CBX )
CX
...
A
BA
... ...
CA
... ...
...
SvX (CCX )
Figure 6: The recursive construction of SvX .
In Figure 6, the leftmost nodes below BX illustrate the construction for |A| = 2 while the leftmost nodes below
CX illustrate it for |A| > 2. In turn, the two triangles represent the subgames starting from the nodes labeled
CBX and CCX while the ellipses indicate where details have been omitted.
23
As Theorem 1 indicates, Condorcet triples may be used to describe SvX more explicitly. To see how, fix an
issue {x , b, c}. Clearly, there are three potential splittings where b and c appear in separate sub-issues:
({b, x}, {c , x}) (b, {c , x}) ({b, x}, c)
Each of these splittings corresponds to the initial stage game of a different simple agenda on {x , b, c}:
(a) (b) (c)
{b, c , x}
{b, x}
b x
{c, x}
c x
{b, c , x}
b {c, x}
c x
{b, c , x}
{b, x}
b x
c
Figure 7: Simple agendas on three alternatives {x , b, c}.
In turn, each of these agendas implements a different combination of outcomes on the two Condorcet triples:
23It is important not to confuse the agenda SX (A) with the agenda SX |A. While the former refers to the subgame at node A in
SX , the latter refers to the pruned agenda on A obtained from SX . As Figure 5 illustrates, these agendas may be quite different.
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Profile\Agenda (a) (b) (c)
Pxbc c b c
Pxcb b b c
Outcomes
Majority loser
between b and c
Outcome b for
both triples
Outcome c for
both triples
Table 1: Outcomes implemented by agendas (a)-(c) on {x , b, c}.
By construction, there exist alternatives bA and cA that appear only on opposite sides of the agenda SvX starting
at any node labeled A. For these alternatives, the outcomes on each issue {x , bA, cA} involving an alternative
x ∈ A must coincide with one of the possibilities in Table 1. Using this to pin down alternatives bA, cA ∈ A,
one can then use Table 1 to describe the unique splitting (BA,CA) of A in terms of Condorcet triples:
BA ≡ {bA} ∪ {x ∈ A \ {bA, cA} : the outcomes on {x , bA, cA} are type-(a) or type-(c)}; and
CA ≡ {cA} ∪ {x ∈ A \ {bA, cA} : the outcomes on {x , bA, cA} are type-(a) or type-(b)}.
Intuitively, the type-(a) outcomes reveal that x appears in both sub-issues of (BA,CA) while the type-(c)
outcomes (resp. type-(b) outcomes) reveal that x appears only in the same sub-issue as bA (resp. cA).
4 Comparison with Recursive Agendas
In this section, I consider a class of agendas that is somewhat broader than the class of simple agendas; and,
highlight two appealing properties of simple agendas that do not extend to every agenda in this class.
4.1 Definitions
Despite their prevalence, history-independence and persistence do not figure in the agenda taxonomy proposed
by Ordeshook and Schwartz. Instead, these authors focus on two other common features of agendas.
The first stipulates that one or more alternatives is eliminated at every non-terminal node. Such an agenda
is non-repetitive: for every non-terminal node q, ci (q) ≡ c(q) ∩ `(qi ) 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2.24 In turn, the second
feature requires that some of the contested outcomes at each node continue to be contested until they are
eliminated or ultimately selected. Such an agenda is continuous: for every non-terminal node q such that
ci (q) 6= ∅, there exists some alternative in ci (q) labels exactly one terminal node below qi .25 In combination,
these two features can be re-stated more succinctly as follows:26
Remark 2 An agenda is non-repetitive and continuous if and only if, for every non-terminal node q and each
successor qi of q, there exists an alternative x
q
i ∈ ci (q) that labels exactly one terminal node below qi .
24This directly implies Farquharson’s Axiom II (see footnote 18 above).
25Originally, Ordeshook and Schwartz [1987, p.185] only defined continuity for “Ordeshook-Schwartz” agendas (see footnote
14). Miller [1995, p.26] later adapted the concept to “Farquharson-Miller” agendas by requiring that every contested alternative
be contested until it is either eliminated or selected. The underlying motivation for the weaker definition given here is to address
the problems pointed out by Groseclose and Krehbiel [1993].
26Example 10 of the Supplementary Appendix shows that the two features are independent.
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Agendas with these two features have an appealing recursive structure. Where `1(TA) denotes the alterna-
tives in A that label exactly one terminal node in TA, TX = S{b,c}⊗{TB ,TC} is non-repetitive and continuous
if and only if: (i) both TB and TC are non-repetitive and continuous; and, (ii) `1(TB)∩`1(TC ) 6= `1(TB), `1(TC )
(so that `1(TB) and `1(TC ) are non-nested). This observation motivates the following definition.
Class 2 An agenda is recursive if it is both non-repetitive and continuous.
In the sequel, I denote a recursive agenda on A by RA; and, the class of all recursive agendas by R. It is not
difficult to show that this class is strictly larger than the class of simple agendas (i.e., R ⊃ S):
Remark 3 (i) Every simple agenda is recursive. (ii) But, not every recursive agenda is simple.
While this does not give a sense of the gap between the two classes, there is reason to suspect that it is
significant. Many recursive agendas seem to lack one (or both) of the features that define simple agendas (see
Example 12 of the Supplementary Appendix); and, their number appears to increase rapidly with |X |.27
4.2 Two Key Distinctions
Despite the apparent gap between the two classes, few recursive agendas used in practice fail to be simple.
None of the agendas discussed by Ordeshook and Schwartz fit into this category, for instance. One plausible
explanation is that voting outcomes on recursive agendas (which are not simple) lack the compelling properties
of voting outcomes on simple agendas. In this section, I identify two such properties.
The first is a monotonicity property for voter preferences. Given a profile P , let P↑x denote a profile where
every voter’s preference is identical to her preference in P except for one voter, whose preference between x
and the immediately preferred alternative (if any) is reversed. Thus, P↑x differs from the original profile P only
by improving the alternative x in the eyes of a single voter. Then, a decision rule v is preference monotonic
at A if, for every P ∈ P, v(P,A) = x implies v(P↑x ,A) = x for every profile P↑x .
Preference Monotonicity At every issue A /∈ X1, v is preference monotonic.
Clearly, every knockout agenda (induces a decision rule that) satisfies Preference Monotonicity (Moulin [1991];
Altman et al. [2009]). To see this, suppose that x is the outcome at P ; and, consider the backward induction
“path” that leads to x . Since each alternative appears only once, what x faces along this path cannot be
affected by improving it. So, x is still the outcome at P↑x . The same is true for Anglo-American agendas
(Moulin [1986, 1991]). Even though some alternatives now appear more than once, the improvement cannot
affect which alternatives the original winner faces. In fact, this argument extends to all simple agendas.
Proposition 1 Every decision rule v implementable by simple agenda satisfies Preference Monotonicity. Con-
versely, for each X such that |X | ≥ 5, there are recursive agendas that violate Preference Monotonicity.
The following example (which extends easily to |X | ≥ 6) establishes the second part of the statement.
27With |X | = 4, six of the fifteen recursive agendas are not simple (see Example 11 of the Supplementary Appendix).
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Example 5 Consider the recursive (but non-persistent) agenda on X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} depicted below.
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}
{x1, x5}
x1 x5
{x2, x3, x4, x5}
x2 {x3, x4, x5}
x3 {x4, x5}
x4 x5
x1
x2
x3
x5
x4 MPX
To see that it violates Preference Monotonicity, fix a profile P which induces the (partial) majority relation MPX
shown above.28 When the majority relation between x4 and x5 is reversed, the outcome switches from x5 to x2.
Since every recursive agenda on |X | ≤ 4 alternatives satisfies Preference Monotonicity, this counter-example is
minimal (both in terms of the number of alternatives and the number of terminal nodes).
The second compelling property of simple agendas relates to implementation on restricted domains.
Definition 10 Given a decision rule v and an issue A ∈ X, the restricted rule vA : P× A→ A is defined by
vA(P,D) ≡ v(P,D) for each (P,D) ∈ P× A.
Pruning provides a way to implement restricted rules: if TX implements v , then the pruned agenda TX |A
implements vA. One drawback is that pruning tends to destroy the structural features of the original agenda.
To illustrate, consider Figure 5. While the agenda on the left is recursive, the pruned version on the right is
not. For a class of agendas T that satisfies the following property, this issue can be avoided.
T -Consistency For every issue A ∈ X, the restricted rule vA is implementable by an agenda TA ∈ T .
Rather than using the pruned agenda TX |A to implement vA, one can use an agenda TA ∈ T . One advantage
relates to the possibility of simplifying the voting procedure: pruned agendas tend to include redundant questions
that cannot affect the outcome for any profile (like the node {c, x} for the right-hand agenda in Figure 5).
Another advantage relates to agenda-setting. Imagine that T represents the agendas permitted by parlia-
mentary procedure; and, A ⊂ X reflects the “real” issue up for debate. By introducing “dummy” alternatives B ,
one might generate an agenda TA∪B ∈ T that differs substantively from the permitted agendas on A (i.e., for
each TA ∈ T , there exists a profile P ∈ P such that UNE [TA∪B|A;P] 6= UNE [TA;P]). By restricting oneself
to a class of agendas T ′ that satisfies T -Consistency, this type of manipulation can be ruled out.
On either account, the most appealing agendas classes are the “self-consistent” classes. Formally, an agenda
class T satisfies Self-Consistency if the decision rule induced by every agenda TA ∈ T satisfies T -Consistency.
28Technically, |N| must be “sufficiently large” relative to |X | (see footnote 16 above). Since |X | = 5, it is enough that |N| ≥ 5.
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Trivially, the Euro-Latin agendas exhibit this property: pruning preserves the structure of the agenda. In fact,
the Anglo-American agendas do as well (Apesteguia et al. [2014]).29 More generally, the class of simple
agendas satisfies Self-Consistency; but, the class of recursive agendas does not.
Proposition 2 Every decision rule v implementable by simple agenda satisfies S-Consistency. Conversely, for
each X such that |X | ≥ 4, there are decision rules implementable by recursive agenda that violateR-Consistency.
The first statement follows from Theorem 1: if v satisfies IS and ILA, then so does the restricted rule vA
on A ⊂ X . (In fact, one can use the recipe in Section 3.3 to define the simple agenda on A that implements
vA.) In turn, the following example (which is easily extended to |X | ≥ 5) establishes the second statement:
Example 6 Consider the two recursive (but non-persistent) agendas on X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} depicted below.
The left-hand agenda violates R-Consistency. To see this, note that the outcome for each Condorcet triple on
{x2, x3, x4} is the majority winner between x2 and x4 — which violates Issue Splitting by Example 4. Conversely,
the right-hand agenda satisfies R-Consistency. To see this, it suffices to check that no pair of Condorcet triples
has outcomes that coincide with the majority winner between two alternatives.
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
x2 {x3, x4}
x3 x4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x3}
x2 x3
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
The left-hand agenda shows that R violates Self-Consistency. In turn, the right-hand agenda shows that S is
not the largest self-consistent sub-class of R: it can be added to S to make a larger self-consistent sub-class.
5 Priority Agendas
After first defining priority agendas, I then characterize the decision rules implemented by agendas in this class.
5.1 Definitions and Examples
A priority agenda on X is defined by an admissible pair (%,α) consisting of a priority % and an amendment
rule α. This pair provides instructions for building the agenda: the priority determines when each alternative is
added to the agenda; and, the amendment rule determines how each is added to the agenda.
Formally, a priority % is a weak ordering on X whose indifference classes contain at most two alternatives.
If x  y , then x has higher priority and is added to the agenda before y . (If x ∼ y , then x and y have equal
29If a decision rule v on X satisfies the axioms listed in their Theorem 2, then so does the restricted rule vA on A ⊂ X .
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priority and are added simultaneously.) Let X˜j denote the j th highest indifference class of % (so that X˜1 denotes
the set of top priority alternative(s) in X and X \ X˜1 the set of non-top priority alternative(s) in X ).
In turn, an amendment rule α is a mapping α : X → X2 ∪X1 ∪ ∅ that assigns at most two alternatives to
each alternative z ∈ X . The interpretation is that α(z) is the (set of) highest priority alternative(s) that are
faced (or “amended”) by z . Formally, one alternative z ∈ X amends another alternative y ∈ X if
y ∈ α(z) or x  y  z for some x ∈ α(z).
In other words, z amends each x ∈ α(z) and each y that is added to the agenda between x and z .
Finally, to be admissible, a pair (%,α) must satisfy the following conditions for each z ∈ X :
(i) if z ∈ X˜1, then α(z) = ∅;
(ii) if z ∈ X˜j and j 6= 1, then α(z) ⊆ X˜k for some k < j ;
(iii) if z , z ′ ∈ X˜j (and j 6= 1), then α(z) = α(z ′); and,
(iv) if z ∈ X˜j+1 and |X˜j | = 2, then α(z) = X˜j or α(z) ⊆ X˜k for some k < j .
These conditions ensure that a pair (%,α) is consistent with the desired interpretation of the parameters.
In words, they stipulate that: (i) top priority alternatives amend nothing; (ii) non-top priority alternatives
amend higher priority alternative(s); (iii) equal priority alternatives amend the same alternative(s); and, (iv) an
alternative with priority immediately below two equal priority alternatives amends both.
To re-construct a priority agenda from an admissible pair (%,α), one uses the amendment rule α to add
the alternatives in decreasing order of priority %. To formalize this recursive construction:
Class 3 Given an admissible pair (%,α) on X , the priority agenda Pr(%,α) is defined as follows:
(1) First, define Pr(%,α)(1) ≡ SX˜1 to be the simple agenda on the top priority alternative(s) X˜1 of %.
(2) Then, for each j > 1, define Pr(%,α)(j + 1) from Pr(%,α)(j) as follows:
(i) If xk ∈ α(xj+1) ∩ X˜k , replace every terminal node of Pr(%,α)(j) labeled by:
- xk with the simple agenda S{xk ,X˜j+1}; and,
- xk ′ ∈ X˜k ′ such that k < k ′ ≤ j with the simple agenda S{xk′ ,X˜j+1}.
(ii) If |X˜j+1| 6= 1, replace every terminal node Xj+1 resulting from (i) with the simple agenda SX˜j+1 .
(3) Finally, define Pr(%,α) ≡ Pr(%,α)(K ) where K ≡ |X/ ∼ | is the number of indifference classes in %.30
At any stage j ≤ K of this recursion, Prj(%,α) is compounded (see Definition 7) by adding simple agendas
(consisting of two or three alternatives) to some of the terminal nodes.31 To illustrate this construction:
30Technically, one must then relabel the non-terminal nodes to conform with Definition 2. Since this step is straightforward but
cumbersome, it has been omitted to preserve clarity. For the details, please see Claim 21 of the Appendix.
31Technically, it is not necessary to add equal priority alternatives simultaneously. Nothing would change by adding them one at
a time (provided that one re-interpreted the amendment rule to mean that the second of the two additions only amends the first).
19
...
... xk ′
(2.i) xk∈α(xj+1)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if xk′=xk or k<k ′≤j
...
... xk′
xk ′ X˜j+1
(2.ii)−−−−−−−−−−−→
if X˜j+1={xj+1,x ′j+1}
...
... xk ′
xk ′ X˜j+1
xj+1 x ′j+1
Figure 8: Detail at the terminal node xk′ in stage j ≤ K of the construction.
This diagram makes it clear that the resulting agenda must be history-independent. In fact, it must also be
persistent (see Claim 23 of the Appendix). In other words, every priority agenda is simple. At the same time,
not every simple agenda is a priority agenda (see Example 3).
Remark 4 (i) Every priority agenda is simple. (ii) But, not every simple agenda is a priority agenda.
For ease of notation, I sometimes suppress the priority-amendment pair (%,α) and simply denote a priority
agenda on X by PrX . I also denote the class of all priority agendas by PR.
The following examples highlight some important features of priority agendas. The first example shows that
Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas are straightforward to represent in terms of priority-amendment pairs.
Example 7 In fact, each of these agendas admits two distinct representations for X = {x1, ..., xm}:
Agenda Representation Priority % Amendment Rule α
strict x1  ...  xm−1  xm α(xi ) = xi−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m
Euro-Latin
weak x1  ...  xm−1 ∼ xm α(xi ) =
 xi−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m − 2xm−2 for i = m − 1,m
strict x1  x2  ...  xm α(xi ) = x1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m
Anglo-American
weak x1 ∼ x2  ...  xm α(xi ) = {x1, x2} for 3 ≤ i ≤ m
In either case, the non-uniqueness is due to symmetry between alternatives (namely xm−1 and xm in the
Euro-Latin agenda; and, x1 and x2 in the Anglo-American agenda). For the symmetric alternatives, one can
either assign equal priority or consecutive priority. In fact, this is true for every priority agenda with symmetric
alternatives. Having said this, non-uniqueness is not limited to agendas with symmetric alternatives (see
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Example 13 of the Supplementary Appendix which discusses the right-hand agenda in Example 2).32
In turn, the second example shows that one can define priority agendas by compounding (see Definition 7):
Example 8 Up to permutation, the only priority agendas on {x1, x2, x3} are the (i) Euro-Latin and (ii) Anglo-
American agendas in Figure 1. By starting from a strict priority on {x1, x2, x3}, there are three distinct ways
to extend each of these agendas into a compound agenda on {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
- Euro-Latin amendment: x4 amends only the lowest priority alternative x3 in {x1, x2, x3}. This leads to
(i) the Euro-Latin agenda in Figure 2 and (ii) the right-hand agenda in Figure 3.
- Anglo-American amendment: x4 amends every alternative in {x1, x2, x3}. This leads to (i) the left-hand
agenda in Figure 3 and (ii) the Anglo-American agenda in Figure 2.
- Intermediate amendment: x4 amends the two lowest priority alternatives x2 and x3 in {x1, x2, x3} (but
not x1). This type of amendment leads to the two agendas depicted in Example 2.
By starting from a weak priority on {x1, x2, x3}, one cannot generate any additional agendas.33 As a result, the
six agendas listed above exhaust the collection of priority agendas on four alternatives (up to permutation).
5.2 Implementation
Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas have the property that the lowest priority alternative is chosen only
when it is unambiguously appealing. To formalize, an alternative a ∈ A is the Condorcet winner for the decision
problem (P,A) ∈ P×X if aMPA x for all x ∈ A \ a. For a decision rule v , an alternative a∗ ∈ A is marginal on
A ∈ X if, for all P ∈ P, v(P,A) = a∗ only if a∗ is the Condorcet winner for (P,A). Then, the stated property
of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas can be formalized as follows:
Marginalization (M) On every issue A ∈ X, v has a marginal alternative.
The next result shows that this property is satisfied by every priority agenda.
Proposition 3 Every decision rule v that is implementable by priority agenda satisfies Marginalization.
In a sense, M is the distinguishing property of decision rules implementable by priority agenda.
Theorem 2 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions) A decision rule v is implementable by priority agenda if
and only if it satisfies Issue Splitting, the Independence of Losing Alternatives, and Marginalization. (Unique-
ness) For every decision rule v satisfying these properties, there is a unique priority agenda PrvX that implements
v ; and, the pair (%v ,αv ) that defines PrvX is fully determined by the outcomes on Condorcet triples.
To establish sufficiency of the axioms, a key step is to determine the priority structure associated with any
decision rule that satisfies the axioms. To do this, I rely on the familiar tool of revealed preference.
32It is worth pointing out that one cannot eliminate multiplicity by requiring a representation to use strict priority. The problem
is that not every priority agenda can be represented with a strict priority (Example 14 of the Supplementary Appendix). Instead,
the way to eliminate multiplicity is to allow strict priority only when it is necessary to represent the agenda.
33While it is possible to generate the other five agendas, one cannot generate the Euro-Latin agenda in Figure 2. By condition
(iv) on admissible pairs, there is no Euro-Latin amendment for the weak representation of the Euro-Latin agenda on {x1, x2, x3}.
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Definition 11 For a decision rule v , first define the binary relations v and ∼v on X as follows:
y v z if there exists an issue A ∈ X such that y ∈ A where z is marginal and y is not; and,
y ∼v z if, for every issue A ∈ X such that y , z ∈ A, y is marginal if and only if z is marginal.
Then, define the revealed priority %v on X by y %v z if y v z or y ∼v z .
For the Anglo-American and Euro-Latin agendas, it is easy to see that the revealed priority reflects the “true”
(underlying) priority. For every issue, the Anglo-American agenda marginalizes the lowest ranked alternative in
A according to %v while the Euro-Latin agenda marginalizes the two lowest ranked alternatives. In fact, %v
defines a priority with these kinds of features for any decision rule that satisfies the axioms:
Lemma 1 If a decision rule v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then: (i) the revealed priority %v defines a priority (i.e.,
%v is a complete and transitive binary relation whose indifference classes contain at most two alternatives);
and; (ii) for each issue A ∈ X, v marginalizes the lowest or two lowest alternatives in A according to %v .
As Theorem 2 indicates, the revealed priority %v can be re-defined entirely in terms of Condorcet triples.
Table 1 suggests how to do this. For each issue {x , y , z}, there are six potential splittings. By Table 1,
each entails a different combination of outcomes on the Condorcet triples Pxyz and Pxzy . Four of the six
combinations directly reveal y v z or z v y while two are consistent with every priority ranking of the
alternatives y and z .34 By varying the alternative x ∈ X \ {y , z}, one can resolve the ambiguous cases and
determine the revealed priority between any two alternatives y and z (see Corollary 1 of the Appendix).
In fact, Table 1 also suggests how to define the amendment rule αv . Intuitively, x is revealed to amend a
higher priority alternative b if the Condorcet triples Pxbc and Pxcb for every alternative c ∈ X \ {x , b} with
intermediate priority yield type-(a) or type-(c) outcomes. Intuitively, this reveals that x must appear in the
same sub-issue as b (see Figure 7). Based on this insight, αv (x) may then be defined as the highest priority
alternative(s) that x is revealed to amend (see Definition 14 and Lemma 2 of the Appendix).
6 Comparison with Euro-Latin and Anglo-American Agendas
In this section, I examine the relationship of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas to the broader class of
priority agendas. I show that four well-known properties of these agendas extend to all priority agendas; and,
highlight a natural way to distinguish Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas from other priority agendas.
6.1 Four Common Properties
It has already been shown that three well-known properties of Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas (namely
Preference Monotonicity, Self-Consistency, and Marginalization) extend to priority agendas.35 Here, I show that
the same is true for a fourth property — a monotonicity condition related to priority.
Given a priority agenda PrX defined by (%,α) and an alternative x ∈ X˜j , fix an alternative y ∈ X (if any)
such that: (i) y ∈ X˜j−1; or, (ii) y ∈ Xj and x is amended by every alternative that amends y . Let Pr↑xX denote
34The two outcome pairs with v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y reveal y v z ; and, the two with v(Pxzy , {x , y , z}) = z reveal z v y .
35Preference Monotonicity and Marginalization follow from Propositions 1 and 3, respectively. In turn, Self-Consistency follows
directly from Theorem 2 (rather than Proposition 2): if a rule v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then so does the restricted rule vA.
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the priority agenda obtained by permuting the labels of the terminal nodes in PrX marked by x and y . The
idea is that Pr↑xX (weakly) improves the priority of x relative to PrX by swapping it with an alternative having
(i) immediately higher priority or (ii) the same priority but weakly fewer amendments.
Priority Monotonicity For every P ∈ P and x ∈ X, UNE [PrX ;P] = x only if UNE [Pr↑xX ;P] = x .
This property posits a straightforward relationship between the structure of a priority agenda and its voting
outcomes. This relationship is known to hold for Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas (Moulin [1986, 1991];
Jung [1990]). In fact, it holds for all priority agendas.
Proposition 4 Every priority agenda satisfies Priority Monotonicity.
6.2 A Key Distinction
There is an sizeable literature on neutral and Condorcet-consistent mappings, called tournament solutions, that
select a subset of the alternatives in A for every issue A and tournament MA on A.36 Arguably the best known
tournament solutions are the Top Cycle and the Banks Set:
Definition 12 The Top Cycle T C (MA) is the subset of alternatives in A that (directly or indirectly) dominate
every other alternative according to MA. Formally, T C (MA) ≡ {x ∈ A : xMA...MAa for all a ∈ A \ x}.
To define the Banks Set, some additional notation is required. A sequence 〈b〉 = b1, ..., bm of alternatives in
A is an MA-transitive chain if bi MAbj for all j > i . In turn, an MA-transitive chain is maximal if there exists
no alternative a ∈ A \ 〈b〉 such that the sequence 〈a, b〉 ≡ a, b1, ..., bm is an MA-transitive chain.
Definition 13 The Banks Set BA(MA) is the subset of alternatives in A that are at the top of some maximal
MA-transitive chain. Formally, BA(MA) ≡ {x ∈ A : x = b1 for some maximal MA-transitive chain 〈b〉}.
Miller [1977] showed that the Top Cycle coincides with the alternatives which are selected from some Euro-
Latin agenda; and, Banks [1985] showed that the set bearing his name coincides with the set of alternatives
which are selected from some Anglo-American agenda. To formalize, let Σ (A) denote the set of permutations
(or bijections) on A; let TσA denote the agenda obtained by permuting the labels of the terminal nodes in TA
using σ ∈ Σ (A); and, let
VΣ (TA;P) ≡
⋃
σ∈Σ(A)
UNE [TσA;P]
denote the collection of outcomes selected at profile P for some re-labeling TσA of the agenda TA. (For a priority
agenda, re-labeling amounts to nothing more than re-prioritizing the alternatives.) Then, the results of Miller
and Banks establish the following for each decision problem (P,A):
(i) VΣ (ELA;P) = TC (MPA ) for every Euro-Latin agenda ELA; and,
(ii) VΣ (AAA;P) = BA(MPA ) for every Anglo-American agenda AAA.
The next proposition provides a natural extension of their results to the entire class of priority agendas:
36Since the particular profile P that induces the majority relation is not material, I suppress it in the notation.
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Proposition 5 For every decision problem (P,A) ∈ P× X and priority agenda PrA on A:
(i’) VΣ (PrA;P) ⊆ TC (MPA ); and,
(ii’) VΣ (PrA;P) ⊇ BA(MPA ).
Part (i’) follows from McKelvey and Niemi’s [1978] insight that, for any agenda, the sophisticated outcome
only depends on the Top Cycle. It is included only as a point of contrast to (i). The real contribution is part
(ii’). For a given x ∈ BA(MPA ), the proof defines a sequence 〈a〉 on A (called a universal sequence) such that
x is selected from every priority agenda PrA when the alternatives are re-prioritized to conform with 〈a〉. This
extends the work of Banks [1985], who leverages the algorithm of Shepsle and Weingast [1984] to construct
a sequence (called a sophisticated sequence) such that x ∈ BA(MPA ) is selected from the associated Anglo-
American agenda. In general, there may be more than one sophisticated sequence for a given x ∈ BA(MPA ).
The key insight is that one of these sequences must be universal for x (see Claim 26 of the Appendix).
Combined with observations (i) and (ii), Proposition 5 establishes the following relationships:
BA(MPA ) = VΣ (AAA;P) ⊆ VΣ (PrA;P) ⊆ VΣ (ELA;P) = TC (MPA ). (†)
Thus, Anglo-American and Euro-Latin agendas reflect the extremes of what can be implemented by prior-
ity agenda. Every other priority agenda displays an intermediate ability to “discriminate” among outcomes.
Formally, TA is more discriminating than T̂A if VΣ (TA;P) ⊆ VΣ (T̂A;P) for every profile P .
It would appear that discrimination is negatively related to marginalization. For every issue (consisting of
three or more alternatives), Euro-Latin agendas marginalize two alternatives; and, Anglo-American agendas
marginalize one. For every other priority agenda, the number of marginal alternatives depends on the issue:
Theorem 3 A decision rule v is implementable by Euro-Latin (resp. Anglo-American) agenda if and only if it
satisfies Issue Splitting and the Independence of Losing Alternatives, and it marginalizes two alternatives (resp.
one alternative) for every issue A /∈ X1 ∪ X2.
This result characterizes implementation by Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agenda by emphasizing the simi-
larities between the two procedures. In recent work, Apesteguia et al. [2014] give alternative characterizations
that emphasize the differences (as described at greater length in the Supplementary Appendix).
7 Applications and Extensions
In this paper, I characterize sophisticated voting for two broad classes of agendas — classes defined by structural
features that are common in legislative settings. For both classes, I establish a close relationship between voting
outcomes and the structure of the agenda. While this advances our understanding of sophisticated voting well
beyond Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas, it also suggests some new avenues of inquiry.
To conclude, I briefly discuss some intriguing possibilities related to manipulation that can arise after the
agenda is already set; and, strategic behavior at the earlier stage of agenda-setting. Of course, both of these
issues are vast; and, the cursory observations below only scratch the surface.
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7.1 Agenda Manipulation
(i) Preference Monotonicity: This property imposes some natural limitations on agenda manipulation. For
one, it discourages voters from misrepresenting their preferences by downgrading an alternative. As noted by
Altman et al. [2009], it also discourages a natural kind of manipulation by the alternatives — which can be
viewed as candidates in an election (or contest). Specifically, it discourages them from “throwing” majority
comparisons with other candidates in order to gain an advantage. Famously, this type of manipulation occurred
during the 2012 Olympic badminton tournament (see Pauly [2013]).
Given its appealing incentive effects, it would be worth identifying the structural features of an agenda that
are necessary and sufficient to guarantee Preference Monotonicity. Proposition 1 goes a long way towards this
goal by identifying two general features that are sufficient (but not necessary). Having said this, there are
agendas that look quite different from simple agendas which nonetheless satisfy Preference Monotonicity.
Remark 5 There exist discontinuous (and non-repetitive) agendas that satisfy Preference Monotonicity.
This suggests that it might be difficult to identify agenda features that are necessary and sufficient.
(ii) Strategic Candidacy: Besides “throwing” comparisons, Dutta et al. [2001] suggest another way for a
candidate to manipulate the outcome: by dropping out of the election. To formalize, let A = {a1, ..., an}
denote the set of candidates; and, suppose that, in all candidate preference profiles Pc ≡ (a1 , ...,an) ∈ Pc,
every candidate ai ∈ A ranks herself first (ai ai x for all x ∈ A \ ai ). Then, a triple (TA;P,Pc) defines a
two-stage game where: (1) a subset of the candidates A∗ ⊆ A independently decides to enter the election; and,
(2) the voters then select one of the entering candidates using the pruned agenda TA|A∗ . Let EQ[TA;P,Pc ]
denote the equilibrium outcomes (if any) of this game where:
- the outcome of (2) is UNE [TA|A∗ ;P] given the set of candidates A∗ who decide to enter in (1); and,
- A∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium outcome of (1) induced by anticipating UNE [TA|B ;P] for all B ⊆ A.
Dutta et al. [2002] consider the special case where the agenda is Anglo-American; and, characterize the set of
outcomes that results when the candidate preferences and priority are allowed to vary. Given a pair (TA,P), let
V˜Σ (TA;P) ≡
⋃
σ∈Σ(A)
Pc∈Pc
EQ[TσA;P,P
c ]
denote the outcomes selected for some re-labeling σ ∈ Σ (A) and some candidate preferences Pc ∈ Pc. Dutta
et al. show that V˜Σ (AAA;P) defines a tournament solution called the Candidate Stable Set.37
Using Proposition 5, it is possible to generalize their result to priority agendas. Where C S(MA) denotes
the Candidate Stable Set associated with MA, one obtains a natural analog of the relationships in (†) above:
Remark 6 For every decision problem (P,A) ∈ P× X and priority agenda PrA on A:
CS(MPA ) = V˜Σ (AAA;P) ⊆ V˜Σ (PrA;P) ⊆ V˜Σ (ELA;P) = TC (MPA ).
37See Definition 16 of the Supplementary Appendix. This solution is nested between the Banks Set and the Uncovered Set
(Miller [1980]) — another tournament solution which specializes the Top Cycle (see Definition 17 of the Supplementary Appendix).
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This remark suggests that the results of the current paper might be used to pursue the study of strategic
candidacy even further. In that regard, the comments made in Section 7.2(i) below apply equally well here: it
would be helpful to understand more about how V˜Σ (PrA; ·) depends on the amendment structure of PrA; and,
how V˜Σ (TA; ·) is determined in the more general case where TA is not a priority agenda.
7.2 Strategic Agenda-Setting
(i) Discriminability: In the literature, VΣ (TA; ·) is interpreted as a measure of how much control an “all-
powerful” chairman can exert by re-arranging the alternatives on the agenda. For this reason, more discrimi-
nating agendas (like Anglo-American agendas) are viewed more favorably than less discriminating agendas (like
Euro-Latin agendas). Theorem 3 and Proposition 5 together suggest that the ability of a priority agenda to
discriminate among outcomes is closely tied to its amendment structure. One natural idea is that a priority
agenda becomes more discriminating as it becomes “bushier” (i.e., as α(x) increases in terms of priority % for
a given alternative x). For a fixed universe of alternatives X , bushiness defines a partial ordering of the priority
agendas on X . However, it does not coincide with the partial ordering defined by discriminability:
Remark 7 For |X | = 4 alternatives, the discriminability and bushiness orderings of priority agendas disagree.
Ideally, one would hope to have a better understanding of the connection between structure and discrim-
inability for priority agendas. Indeed, one might even hope to identify such a connection for the broader classes
of simple agendas or recursive agendas (see Tables 3 and 4 of the Supplementary Appendix).
Besides this issue, Proposition 5 raises another interesting question — related to the fact that the Uncovered
Set (see footnote 37) is the only well-known tournament solution nested between the Banks Set and the Top
Cycle. For every issue A, Horan [2013] shows that there exists an agenda TA whose outcomes VΣ (TA;P)
coincide with the Uncovered Set UC (MPA ) on every profile P ∈ P. Since his result says nothing about the
structure of TA, it would be worth knowing whether it could be a priority agenda for every issue A.
(ii) Self-Consistency: Another plausible way to manipulate decision rules is by adding “dummy” alternatives
to the agenda (Campbell [1979]; Miller [1995]). Provided that the class of permissible agendas satisfies Self-
Consistency, there is no added benefit to this kind of manipulation: whatever decision rule that can be achieved
in this way can also be achieved by restructuring the original agenda.
In light of this, it would be worth identifying some natural agenda classes that satisfy Self-Consistency.
Proposition 1 already makes some significant progress — by showing that the simple agendas S exhibit this
property while the recursive agendas R do not. Example 6 goes even further — by establishing that there are
classes of agendas nested between S and R which satisfy Self-Consistency. In fact, as the following remark
guarantees, there is a maximal sub-class Rsc ⊆ R with this property:
Remark 8 For every class of agendas T , there exists a maximal sub-class which satisfies Self-Consistency.
Along the lines of the current paper, it would be interesting to determine the structural features that define
the agendas in Rsc ; and, to characterize the family of decision rules implemented by these agendas.
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9 Mathematical Appendix
9.1 Primer on Graph Theory
A graph G = (Q,E ) is a pair consisting of: a collection of nodes Q; and, a collection of (undirected) edges E , each
of which connects two nodes q and q˜ in Q. It is labeled if each node q ∈ Q has a label `(q); finite if |Q| is finite;
and, loopless if there exist no edges in E (called loops) that connect a node in Q to itself. A (simple) path in G is a
non-repeating sequence of nodes in Q such that each adjacent pair in the sequence is connected by an edge in E .
A tree T = (Q,E ) is a loopless graph such that every pair of distinct nodes in Q is connected by a unique simple
path. In a tree, nodes can be ordered in a natural way. In particular, a node q′ ∈ Q is between two nodes q, q′′ ∈ Q if
the path from q to q′′ (inclusive of the end nodes) passes through q′.
A tree is rooted if one node r ∈ Q is specially designated as the root. In a rooted tree Tr ≡ (Q,E , r), betweenness
defines a partial ordering ≤E on the nodes where q ≤E q˜ for q, q˜ ∈ Q if q is between the root r and the node q˜. (It is
easy to see that ≤E is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.) Equivalently, the nodes exhibit a strict partial ordering
<E defined by q <E q˜ for q, q˜ ∈ Q if q ≤E q˜ and q 6= q˜. Alternatively, a rooted tree can be defined directly in terms
of the nodes Q and a partial ordering ≤ (or a strict partial ordering <) on Q. In either case, the collection of edges
E< is defined by {q, q˜} ∈ E< if q < q˜ and q < q′ < q˜ for no q˜ ∈ Q. In a rooted tree Tr , q˜ ∈ Q is a predecessor
(resp. successor) of q ∈ Q if {q, q˜} ∈ E< and q˜ < q (resp. q < q˜). In turn, a node q ∈ Q is said to be terminal if
it has no successors; and, non-terminal otherwise. By construction, every non-root node of a rooted tree has a unique
predecessor; and, every non-terminal node has a successor.
Finally, a binary tree is a rooted and labeled tree such that every non-terminal node in Q has exactly two successors.
9.2 Proof of Remark 1
Suppose that v is implemented by TX . Then, v(PA,X ) ≡ UNE [TX ;PA] and v(P,A) ≡ UNE [TX |A;P] by definition. To
see that UNE [TX ;PA] = UNE [TX |A;PA], note that “backward induction” determines the UNE on any agenda. In any
terminal subgame, it selects the Condorcet winner. One can then delete the Condorcet loser and repeat the argument
on the resulting (smaller) agenda. Since PA and P coincide on A, UNE [TX |A;PA] = UNE [TX |A;P] as well. Combining
these equalities gives v(PA,X ) = UNE [TX ;PA] = UNE [TX |A;PA] = UNE [TX |A;P] = v(P,A) as required.
9.3 Proof of Remarks 2 and 3
Proof of Remark 2. Let q denote a non-terminal node of the agenda TX . (⇒) Since TX is non-repetitive, ci (q) 6= ∅.
Since TX is continuous, some xi ∈ ci (q) labels exactly one terminal node below qi for i = 1, 2. (⇐) By assumption,
ci (q) 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2. So, TX is non-repetitive. By assumption, some xi ∈ ci (q) also labels exactly one terminal node
below qi for i = 1, 2. So, TX is also continuous.
Claim 1 Every history-independent agenda is non-repetitive.
Proof. Fix a history-independent agenda TX ; and, consider a non-terminal node q where `(q) ≡ B. By way of
contradiction, suppose `(q1) = B and `(q2) ≡ C ⊆ B. By history-independence, the successors of q1 are labeled B and
C . Repeating this argument, there is an infinite path down the agenda from q where every node is labeled by B. But,
this contradicts the fact that TX is finite.
Claim 2 Every simple agenda is continuous.
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Proof. Fix a simple agenda SX . The proof is by strong induction on |X | = m.
The base cases m = 2, 3 follow from Claim 1. To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and
consider the case m = n + 1. Let r denote the root; and, r1 and r2 its two successors. Since SX is simple, the agenda
SiX starting from ri is simple for i = 1, 2. Since SX is non-repetitive by Claim 1, `(ri ) ⊂ X for i = 1, 2. So, each SiX is
continuous by the induction hypothesis. By Claim 1, each SiX is also non-repetitive. Let ri1 and ri2 denote the successors
of ri . By Remark 2, some xi j ∈ cj(ri ) labels exactly one terminal node below ri j for j = 1, 2.
Given Remark 2, the proof is complete if xi1 ∈ ci (r) or xi2 ∈ ci (r) for i = 1, 2. By way of contradiction, suppose
xi1, xi2 ∈ u(r). Now, consider any terminal node t below ri . By persistence, there exists a node qt (between r and t)
with a successor labeled u(r). Since xi1 ∈ c1(ri ) and xi2 ∈ c2(ri ), it cannot be any node between ri and t. So, the only
possibility is that qt = r . Hence, u(r) ∈ {`(r1), `(r2)}. Without loss of generality, suppose `(r1) = u(r). Then, it must
be that `(r2) = c(r) ∪ u(r) = `(r). But, this contradicts the fact that SX is non-repetitive (by Claim 1).
Proof of Remark 3. (i) By Claims 1 and 2. (ii) It is easy to check that the left-hand agenda in Figure 5 is recursive.
However, it is not simple. Since the two nodes labeled {x , b, c} give rise to distinct sub-agendas, it violates history-
independence. (Still, it is persistent: the root r is the only node with uncontested alternatives; and, both of its successors
have successors labeled u(r) = {x , b, c}.
Claim 3 Given a simple agenda SX with a non-terminal node q such that u(q) 6= ∅ and a terminal node t below q,
there exists a unique non-terminal node qt between q and t such that u(q) ∈ {`(qt1), `(qt2)}. Consequently:
(a.i) ∅ ⊂ `(qt) ∩ c(q) ⊆ `(qt1) ⊂ `(qt) and u(q) = `(qt2) ⊂ `(qt) at node qt ; and,
(a.ii) u(q) ⊂ `(q˜i ) ⊂ `(q˜) for i = 1, 2 at each node q˜ strictly between q and qt .
What is more, the contested outcomes at the nodes between q and qt satisfy the following:
(b.i) `(qt) ∩ c(q) ⊂ c(qt) ⊆ `(qt) at node qt ; and,
(b.ii) ∅ ⊂ c(q˜) ⊆ `(q˜) ∩ c(q) at each node q˜ strictly between q and qt .
Proof. The fact that SX is persistent and non-repetitive (by Claim 1) implies the first part of the claim. (a.i) Without
loss of generality, u(q) = `(qt2) by the first part of the claim. So, `(q
t
1) ⊇ `(qt)\ `(qt2) = `(qt)\u(q) = `(qt)∩ c(q) ⊃ ∅
as required. And, since SX is non-repetitive, `(q˜i ) ⊂ `(q˜) for i = 1, 2. (a.ii) For the lower bounds: u(q) ⊂ `(q˜i ) by
the first part of the claim. For the upper bounds: `(q˜i ) ⊂ `(q˜) since SX is non-repetitive. (b.i) For the lower bound:
note that c1(qt) ⊇ `(qt) ∩ c(q) by (a.i); and, c2(qt) ⊃ ∅ since SX is non-repetitive. For the upper bound: note that
c(qt) = `(qt) if `(qt1) = `(q
t) ∩ c(q). (b.ii) For the lower bound: note that c(q˜) ⊃ ∅ since SX is non-repetitive. For
the upper bound: note that c(q˜) = `(q˜) ∩ c(q) if (c˜1, c˜2) partitions `(q˜) ∩ c(q) and `(qti ) ≡ u(q) ∪ c˜i for i = 1, 2.
9.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Sub-section 1 establishes sufficiency, while sub-sections 2 and 3 establish necessity and uniqueness, respectively.
9.4.1 Sufficiency of IS and ILA
Remark 9 For A = B ∪ C , the following are equivalent: (i) B,C 6= A; (ii) B ∩ C 6= B,C ; and, (iii) B \ C ,C \ B 6= ∅.
Proof. (i)⇒ (i i): Suppose B ∩ C = B. Then, C = (B ∩ C ) ∪ C = B ∪ C = A which is a contradiction. (i i)⇒ (i i i):
Suppose B \C = ∅. Then, B = (B ∩C )∪ (B \C ) = (B ∩C )∪∅ = B ∩C which is a contradiction. (i i i)⇒ (i): Suppose
B = A. Then, C \ B = C \ A = ∅ which is a contradiction.
Claim 4 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then v(P,A) = v(P ′,A) for all P,P ′ ∈ P that coincide on A ∈ X.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on |A|. The base case |A| = 2 follows from ILA. To complete the induction, suppose
the claim holds for |A| = n and consider the case |A| = n + 1. Then, IS, the induction hypothesis, and the base case
imply v(P,A) = v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}) = v(P, {v(P ′,B), v(P ′,C )}) = v(P ′, {v(P ′,B), v(P ′,C )}) = v(P ′,A).
Claim 5 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) for all (P,A) ∈ P× X.
Proof. By ILA, v(PA,X ) = ... = v(PA,A). Since v(PA,A) = v(P,A) by Claim 4, v(PA,X ) = v(P,A).
Claim 6 Suppose v satisfies IS and ILA. If (B,C ) splits A /∈ X1 and D ⊂ A, then:
(i) v(P,D) = v(P, {v(P,B ∩ D), v(P,C ∩ D)}); and, (ii) (B ∩ D,C ∩ D) splits D if D 6= B ∩ D,C ∩ D.
Proof. Fix some x ∈ A and let Px coincide with P except that x is demoted to Condorcet loser on A. Then,
v(P,A \ x) = v(Px ,A \ x) = v(Px ,A) = v(Px , {v(Px ,B), v(Px ,C )}) = ... = v(P, {v(P,B \ x), v(P,C \ x)}) by Claim
4, ILA, and IS. Part (i) follows by repeated application of this reasoning. For part (ii), observe that D 6= B ∩ D,C ∩ D
implies B ∩ C ∩ D 6= B ∩ D,C ∩ D by Remark 9. So, (B ∩ D,C ∩ D) splits D by part (i).
Claim 7 Suppose v satisfies IS and ILA. If (B,C ) splits A /∈ X1 and ∅ ⊂ B ∩ C ⊂ D ⊆ C , then either:
(i) (B ′,B ∩ C ) splits D for some B ′ ⊂ D; or, (ii) (B ′,C ′) splits D for some B ′,C ′ ⊃ B ∩ C .
Proof. Let (B ′,C ′) denote a splitting of D. To establish the result, it suffices to show: (1) B ∩C ⊆ B ′ or B ∩C ⊆ C ′;
and, (2) B ∩ C = C ′ if B ∩ C 6⊆ B ′. Given (1) and (2), the only two possibilities for (B ′,C ′) are (i) and (ii).
(1) By way of contradiction, suppose B ∩C 6⊆ B ′,C ′. Fix alternatives b ∈ (B ∩C ) \C ′ and c ∈ (B ∩C ) \B ′. Since
B ∩ C ⊂ D, there exists some d ∈ D \ (B ∩ C ). Without loss of generality: (a) d ∈ B ′ ∩ C ′; or, (b) d ∈ B ′ \ C ′ (since
d ∈ C ′ \ B ′ is similar). Since (B,C ) splits A, v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {v(P, {b, c}), v(P, {b, c , d})}) by Claim 6(i).
For cases (a) and (b), I show that this entails a contradiction. (a) Since (B ′,C ′) splits D,
v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {v(P, {b, d}), v(P, {c , d})}).
So, v(Pbcd , {b, c , d}) = c for the Condorcet triple Pbcd . Combining this with the formula in the last paragraph implies
c = v(Pbcd , {b, c , d}) = v(Pbcd , {v(Pbcd , {b, c}), v(Pbcd , {b, c , d})}) = v(Pbcd , {b, c}) = b,
which is a contradiction. (b) Since (B ′,C ′) splits D, v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {v(P, {b, d}), c}). So, v(Pbcd , {b, c , d}) =
c . Then, by the same reasoning as in case (a), this entails the contradiction that c = v(Pbcd , {b, c , d}) = b.
(2) Since B∩C 6⊆ B ′, B∩C ⊆ C ′ by (1). By way of contradiction, suppose B∩C ⊂ C ′. Fix alternatives b ∈ B ′\C ′,
c ∈ (B ∩ C ) \ B ′, and d ∈ C ′ \ (B ∩ C ). Since B ∩ C ⊂ C ′, b ∈ B ′ \ (B ∩ C ). There are two cases: (a) d ∈ B ′ ∩ C ′;
and, (b) d ∈ C ′ \ B ′. Since (B,C ) splits A, v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {c , v(P, {b, c , d})}) by Claim 6(i).
For cases (a) and (b), I show that this entails a contradiction. (a) Since (B ′,C ′) splits D,
v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {v(P, {b, d}), v(P, {c , d})}).
So, v(Pbdc , {b, c , d}) = b for the Condorcet triple Pbdc . Combining this with the formula in the last paragraph implies
b = v(Pbdc , {b, c , d}) = v(Pbdc , {c , v(Pbdc , {b, c , d})}) = v(Pbdc , {b, c}) = c ,
which is a contradiction. (b) Since (B ′,C ′) splits D, v(P, {b, c , d}) = v(P, {b, v(P, {c , d})}). So, v(Pbdc , {b, c , d}) =
c . Then, by the same reasoning as in case (a), this entails the contradiction that b = v(Pbdc , {b, c , d}) = c .
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Claim 8 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then there exists a unique splitting for all A /∈ X1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on |A|. The case |A| = 2 is trivial. For |A| = 3, Table 1 shows that every potential
splitting of A yields a distinct pair of outcomes on the two Condorcet triples. So, the splitting of A must be unique.
To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for |A| = n and consider |A| = n + 1. By way of contradiction,
suppose (B,C ) and (B ′,C ′) are distinct splittings of A. First, suppose (B,C ) and (B ′,C ′) partition A. Then, there
exists some x ∈ A such that (B \ x ,C \ x) and (B ′ \ x ,C ′ \ x) are distinct partitions of A \ x , which contradicts the
induction hypothesis. Next, suppose x ∈ B ∩ C for some x ∈ A. If x ∈ B ′ ∩ C ′, then (B \ x ,C \ x) and (B ′ \ x ,C ′ \ x)
are distinct splittings of A \ x , which again contradicts the induction hypothesis. Finally, suppose x ∈ B ′ \ C ′. There
are two cases for (B \ x ,C \ x) and (B ′ \ x ,C ′ \ x): either (i) they coincide; or, (ii) they are distinct.
(i) Without loss of generality, B \ x = B ′ \ x and C \ x = C ′ (the only other possibility is symmetric). Since (B,C )
splits A, there exist alternatives b ∈ B \C and c ∈ C \B. Since B \x = B ′\x and C \x = C ′, b ∈ B ′\C ′ and c ∈ C ′\B ′.
Now, consider D = {b, c , x}. From the observations above: (B ∩ D,C ∩ D) = ({x , b}, {x , c}) and (B ′ ∩ D,C ′ ∩ D) =
({x , b}, {c}). For the Condorcet triple Pbxc : v(Pbxc , {v(Pbxc ,B ∩ D), v(Pbxc ,C ∩ D)}) = v(Pbxc , {b, x}) = b; and,
v(Pbxc , {v(Pbxc ,B ′ ∩ D), v(Pbxc ,C ′ ∩ D)}) = v(Pbxc , {b, c}) = c . But, this contradicts Claim 6(i).
(ii) First, suppose B ′ \ C ′ 6= x . Then (B \ x ,C \ x) and (B ′ \ x ,C ′ \ x) are distinct splittings of A \ x , which
contradicts the induction hypothesis. Next, suppose B ′ \ C ′ = x . Since (B,C ) splits A, there exist b ∈ B \ C and
c ∈ C \B. Now, consider D = {b, c , x}. From the observations above: (B∩D,C∩D) = ({x , b}, {x , c}), x ∈ B ′\C ′, and
b, c ∈ C ′. The last two set inclusions leave three possibilities: (a) (B ′∩D,C ′∩D) = ({x}, {b, c}); (b) (B ′∩D,C ′∩D) =
({x , b}, {b, c}); and, (c) (B ′∩D,C ′∩D) = ({x , b, c}, {b, c}). For (a)-(b), v(Pbcx , {v(Pbcx ,B∩D), v(Pbcx ,C ∩D)}) =
v(Pbcx , {x , c}) = c and v(Pbcx , {v(Pbcx ,B ′ ∩ D), v(Pbcx ,C ′ ∩ D)}) = v(Pbcx , {x , b}) = x . But, this contradicts
Claim 6(i). For (c), v(Pbcx ,D) = c by Claim 6(i); and, v(Pbcx ,D) = v(Pbcx , {v(Pbcx ,B ′ ∩ D), v(Pbcx ,C ′ ∩ D)}) =
v(Pbcx , {v(Pbcx ,D), v(Pbcx , {b, c})}) = v(Pbcx , {c , b}) = b. But, this is a contradiction.
Note: In the proof of Claims 9 and 10, I abuse notation by referring to a node q of SvX by its label `(q). By virtue of
Claim 8 however, this abuse does not create any possibility for confusion.
Claim 9 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then SvX defines a simple agenda.
Proof. By Claim 8, the recursive construction of SvX described in the text is well-defined. Since v satisfies IS, this
construction is finitary and, thus, defines an agenda. Clearly, SvX is history-independent by construction. The proof that
SvX is persistent is by strong induction on |X | = m. The base cases m = 2, 3 follow from IS and the definition of SvX . To
complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n + 1.
Let B1 and C1 denote the successors of the root X in SvX . Consider the restricted decision rules vB1 and vC1 on B1
and C1 (see Definition 10). Note that vB1 and vC1 inherit IS and ILA from v ; and, |B1|, |C1| ≤ n (since B1,C1 ⊂ X by
IS). By the induction hypothesis, it follows that SvB1B1 and S
vC1
C1
are persistent. Since SvX (B1) = S
vB1
B1
and SvX (C1) = S
vC1
C1
by
construction, this establishes that SvX is persistent at every non-terminal node except possibly the root X .
To check persistence at X , suppose B1 ∩ C1 6= ∅ and consider any terminal node x below C1. Let X ,C1, ...,Cnx , x
denote the path from X to x . First, consider the node C1. By construction of SvX , (B2,C2) splits C1 ⊃ B1 ∩ C1. By
Claim 7, there are three possibilities: B2 = B1 ∩ C1; C2 = B1 ∩ C1; or, B2,C2 ⊃ B1 ∩ C1. In the first two cases, C1 is
a node between X and x with a successor B1 ∩ C1. In the third case, consider the node C2. Since B1 ∩ C1 ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1,
Claim 7 applies. So, one can repeat the argument given for C1. Since SvX is finite, continuing inductively in the same
vein establishes that one of the nodes Ci between X and x must have a successor B1 ∩ C1.
By the same argument, the same is true for any terminal node x below B1. So, SvX is persistent at X .
Claim 10 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then SvX implements v .
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Proof. By Claim 9, SvX defines an agenda. The proof that it implements v is by strong induction on |X | = m. The base
cases m = 2, 3 follow from IS and the definition of SvX . To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n
and consider the case m = n + 1. It suffices to show that v(P,X ) = UNE [SvX ;P] for all P ∈ P. (To see this, fix some
(P,A) ∈ P× X. Since v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) (by Claim 5) and UNE [SvX ;PA] = UNE [SvX |A;P] (by Remark 1), it follows
that v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) = UNE [SvX ;P
A] = UNE [SvX |A;P]. In other words, S
v
X implements v .)
To show that v(P,X ) = UNE [SvX ;P], let B and C denote the successors of the root X in S
v
X . Consider the re-
stricted decision rules vB and vC on B and C. By the induction hypothesis, SvBB implements vB and S
vC
C implements vC .
Since SvX (B) = S
vB
B and S
v
X (C ) = S
vC
C by construction, vB(P,B) = UNE [S
v
X (B);P] and vC (P,C ) = UNE [S
v
X (C );P].
Like the UNE , v selects the Condorcet winner between two alternatives (by ILA). So, “backward induction” re-
quires UNE [SvX ;P] = v(P, {vB(P,B), vC (P,C )}). By definition of vB and vC , it then follows that UNE [SvX ;P] =
v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}). And, since (B,C ) splits X by construction, v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}) = v(P,X ). Combining
these observations gives v(P,X ) = v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}) = UNE [SvX ;P] as required.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Sufficiency). This follows directly from Claims 9-10 above.
9.4.2 Necessity of IS and ILA
Note: In this section, I frequently abuse notation by referring to a node q of SX by its label `(q). Since SX is simple
(and, thus, history-independent by the discussion in the text), this abuse does not create any possibility for confusion.
Claim 11 If SX is a simple agenda where B and C are the successors of the root X , then:
UNE [SX ;P] = x ∈ B ∩ C implies UNE [SX (B);P] = x = UNE [SX (C );P].
Proof. The proof is by strong induction on |X | = m. The base cases m = 2, 3 follow from the fact that SX is
non-repetitive (by Claim 1). To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case
m = n+1. By way of contradiction, suppose the claim is false. Since x must be selected from SX (B) or SX (B), suppose
UNE [SX (B);P] = xM
P
X c = UNE [SX (C );P].
First, consider SX (B). Since SX is simple, so is SX (B). By persistence, every path to a terminal node t below B
passes through a node B∗t (potentially B) with successors Bt and B ∩ C . Let T (B, x) ≡ {t : x ∈ Bt}. There are two
cases: (i) T (B, x) = ∅; and, (ii) T (B, x) 6= ∅. For both, UNE [SX (B ∩ C );P] = x . (i) Since UNE [SX (B);P] = x
and x /∈ Bt for all t below B, “backward induction” requires UNE [SX (B ∩ C );P] = x . (ii) Since UNE [SX (B);P] = x ,
“backward induction” requires UNE [SX (B∗t );P] = x for some t ∈ T (B, x). Since SX is non-repetitive by Claim 1,
B∗t ⊂ X so that |B∗t | ≤ n. Since SX (B∗t ) is simple, the induction hypothesis implies UNE [SX (B ∩ C );P] = x .
Next, consider SX (C ). If c ∈ B∩C , the same reasoning as in the last paragraph establishes UNE [SX (B∩C );P] = c ,
which is a contradiction. So, c ∈ C \ B. By persistence, every path to a terminal node t below C passes through a
node C∗t (potentially C ) with successors Ct and B ∩ C . Let T (C , c) ≡ {t : c ∈ Ct}. By construction, T (C , c) 6=
∅. Since UNE [SX (C );P] = c , “backward induction” requires UNE [SX (Ct);P] = c for some t ∈ T (C , c). Since
UNE [SX (B ∩ C );P] = x and xMPX c however, UNE [SX (C∗t );P] = x . It then follows from “backward induction” that
UNE [SX (Ct);P] 6= c , which is a contradiction.
Claim 12 If SX is a simple agenda where B and C are the successors of the root X , UNE [SX |B ;P] = UNE [SX (B);P].
Proof. If B ∩ C = ∅, then SX |B = SX (B) by definition and the claim follows. So, suppose B ∩ C 6= ∅. Fix a
profile P ∈ P such that UNE [SX |B ;P] = b. By Remark 1, UNE [SX ;PB ] = b. Since P and PB coincide on B,
the proof is complete if UNE [SX (B);PB ] = b. (In that case, UNE [SX (B);P] = b = UNE [SX |B ;P].) To establish
UNE [SX (B);P
B ] = b, there are two cases: (i) b ∈ B \C ; and, (ii) b ∈ B∩C . (i) Since b ∈ B \C , “backward induction”
requires UNE [SX (B);PB ] = b. (ii) Since UNE [SX ;PB ] = b ∈ B ∩ C , Claim 11 implies UNE [SX (B);PB ] = b.
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Claim 13 If a decision rule v is implementable by simple agenda, then it satisfies IS.
Proof. Suppose v is implemented by SX . The proof is by strong induction on |X | = m. Since SX is non-repetitive (by
Claim 1), the base cases m = 2, 3 are trivial. To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider
the case m = n + 1. Let B and C denote the two successors of the root X . To establish the induction step, fix an issue
A ∈ X−1. Without loss of generality, there are two possibilities: (1) A 6⊆ B,C ; or, (2) A ⊆ B.
(1) In this case, (B ∩ A,C ∩ A) splits A. To see this, it suffices to check conditions (i)-(iii) of the definition. (i)
Since B ∪ C = X , it follows that (B ∩ A) ∪ (C ∩ A) = (B ∪ C ) ∩ A = X ∩ A = A. (ii) By way of contradiction,
suppose that B ∩ A = (B ∩ A) ∩ (C ∩ A). Then, A = (B ∩ A) ∪ (C ∩ A) = [(B ∩ A) ∩ (C ∩ A)] ∪ (C ∩ A) = C ∩ A.
So, A ⊆ C which is a contradiction. (iii) Note that v(P,B) ≡ UNE [SX |B ;P] = UNE [SX (B);P] and v(P,C ) ≡
UNE [SX |C ;P] = UNE [SX (C );P] by Claim 12. Since v(P,X ) ≡ UNE [SX ;P] as well, “backward induction” requires
v(P,X ) = v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}). Combined with Remark 1, this identity implies the following:
v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) = v(PA, {v(PA,B), v(PA,C )}) = v(PA, {v(PB∩A,X ), v(PC∩A,X )})
= v(PA, {v(P,B ∩ A), v(P,C ∩ A)}) = v(P{v(P,B∩A),v(P,C∩A)},X )
= v(P, {v(P,B ∩ A), v(P,C ∩ A)}).
(2) By Claim 12, v(P,B) ≡ UNE [SX |B ;P] = UNE [SX (B);P]. By Remark 1, it follows that SX (B) implements the
restricted decision rule vB on B. Since SX is non-repetitive by Claim 1, B ⊂ X so that |B| ≤ n. Since SX is simple, so
is SX (B). By the induction hypothesis, it then follows that A is splittable for vB . To conclude, suppose (BA,CA) splits
A for vB . Since vB(P,D) ≡ v(P,D) for all D ∈ B, it follows that (BA,CA) also splits A for v .
Proof of Theorem 1 (Necessity). Let v denote the decision rule implemented by a simple agenda SX . By Claim 13,
v satisfies IS. By the argument given in the text (after the statement of the theorem), v also satisfies ILA.
9.4.3 Proof of Uniqueness
Note: In this section, I abuse notation by referring to a node q of a simple agenda SX by its label `(q).
As outlined in the text, the outcomes of v on Condorcet triples uniquely identify SvX . The proof that S
v
X is the only
simple agenda implementing v by strong induction on |X | = m. The base cases m = 2, 3 follow from IS. To complete the
induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n+1. Fix a simple agenda SX that implements
v ; and, let B and C denote the two successors of the root X in SX .
First, note that (B,C ) is the unique splitting of X . Given Claim 8, it suffices to check conditions (i)-(iii) of the
definition. (i) Since SX is an agenda, B ∪ C = X . (ii) Since SX is non-repetitive (by Claim 1), B,C 6= B ∩ C (by
Remark 9). (iii) By Claim 12, UNE [SX |B ;P] = UNE [SX (B);P] and UNE [SX |C ;P] = UNE [SX (C );P] for all P ∈ P.
Since SX implements v , v(P,B) = UNE [SX |B ;P] and v(P,C ) = UNE [SX |C ;P]. So, v(P,B) = UNE [SX (B);P] and
v(P,C ) = UNE [SX (C );P]. Since v(P,X ) = UNE [SX ;P] as well, v(P,X ) = v(P, {v(P,B), v(P,C )}.
To conclude, consider the restricted decision rules vB and vC on B and C. As shown in the last paragraph,
vB(P,B) = UNE [SX (B);P] and vC (P,C ) = UNE [SX (C );P] for all P ∈ P. So, SX (B) implements vB (by Remark 1);
and, similarly, SX (C ) implements vC . Since SX is simple, so are SX (B) and SX (C ). By the induction hypothesis, SvBB
(resp. SvCC ) is the unique simple agenda that implements vB (resp. vC ). Consequently, S
vB
B = SX (B) and S
vC
C = SX (C ).
Since (B,C ) splits X (as shown in the last paragraph), it then follows from the definition of SvX that SX = S
v
X .
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9.5 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a decision rule v that is implementable by simple agenda. It suffices to show that
v is preference monotonic at X . Since v(P,A) = v(PA,X ) by Remark 1, the result follows for A ⊂ X . The proof is by
strong induction on |X | ≡ m. The base cases m = 2, 3 are trivial.
To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n + 1. Let SX denote
a simple agenda that implements v ; and, let B and C denote the successors of the root X . For a profile P such that
v(P,X ) ≡ UNE [SX ;P] = x , there are two cases: (i) x ∈ B ∩ C ; and, (ii) x ∈ B \ C .
(i) By Claim 11, UNE [SX (B);P] = UNE [SX (C );P] = x . Since SX is non-repetitive by Claim 1, B,C ⊂ X so that
|B|, |C | ≤ n. Since SX is simple, so are SX (B) and SX (C ). So, UNE [SX (B);P↑x ] = x and UNE [SX (C );P↑x ] = x
by the induction hypothesis. Then, “backward induction” requires v(P↑x ,X ) ≡ UNE [SX ;P↑x ] = x . (ii) By the same
reasoning as case (i), UNE [SX (B);P↑x ] = UNE [SX (B);P] = x . Moreover, UNE [SX (C );P↑x ] = UNE [SX (C );P] since
x /∈ C . Then, “backward induction” requires v(P↑x ,X ) ≡ UNE [SX ;P↑x ] = x .
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows directly from the discussion in the text.
9.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Sub-sections 1 and 2 establish sufficiency and necessity, respectively.
9.6.1 Sufficiency of IS, ILA, and M
Claim 14 Suppose v satisfies IS and ILA. If a∗ is marginal for A /∈ X1 and x ∈ A \ a∗, then a∗ is marginal for A \ x .
Proof. Fix some x ∈ A \ a∗. By way of contradiction, suppose v(P,A \ x) = a∗ for some profile P where a∗ is not the
Condorcet winner in A \ x . By Claim 4, v(Px ,A \ x) = v(P,A \ x) for any profile Px that coincides with P except x is
demoted to Condorcet loser in A. Moreover, v(Px ,A) = v(Px ,A \ x) by ILA. So, v(Px ,A) = a∗, which contradicts the
assumption that a∗ is marginal for A.
Claim 15 If v satisfies IS and ILA, then every A ∈ X has at most two marginal alternatives.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Denote any three marginal alternatives in A by x , y , and z and consider the Condorcet triple
Pxyz (as defined in the text). Then, v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) /∈ {x , y , z} by Claim 14, which is a contradiction.
Claim 16 Suppose v satisfies IS and ILA. If (B,C ) splits A /∈ X1 and a∗ is marginal for A, then:
(i) if a∗ ∈ C \B, then (B,C ) = (b,A \ b); and, (ii) if a∗ ∈ B ∩C and a∗∗ is also marginal for A, then a∗∗ ∈ B ∩C .
Proof. (i) By way of contradiction, suppose |B \ C | ≥ 2. Fix b, b′ ∈ B \ C and consider the triple Pa∗bb′ . By Claim 6,
v(Pa∗bb′ , {a∗, b, b′}) = v(Pa∗bb′ , {v(Pa∗bb′ , {b, b′}), a∗}) = a∗. By Claim 14, this contradicts the assumption that a∗ is
marginal for A. (ii) By way of contradiction, suppose a∗∗ ∈ C \ B. Fix some b ∈ B \ C and consider the triple Pa∗ba∗∗ .
Then, a contradiction obtains along the same lines as (i).
(a) Proof of Lemma 1 – The Revealed Priority
Claim 17 If v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then v is asymmetric and %v is complete.
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Proof. By definition of ∼v , the completeness of %v follows from the asymmetry of v . To see that v is asymmetric,
suppose y v z and z v y for some y , z ∈ X ; and, let Y and Z denote issues that reveal y v z and z v y ,
respectively. The proof that this amounts to a contradiction is by induction on |Y ∪ Z |.
For the base case |Y ∪ Z | = 4, it must be that Y = {a∗, y , z} and Z = {x , y , z} for alternatives a∗, x ∈ X . (The
possibility that Y = {y , z} is ruled out by ILA; and, the possibility that Z ⊂ Y is ruled out by Claim 14.) By Claim 14,
neither y nor z can be marginal for Y ∪ Z . Since some alternative must be marginal for Y ∪ Z by M, suppose, without
loss of generality, that a∗ is marginal. Then, a∗ is also marginal for Y by Claim 14. Now, consider the splitting (B,C )
of {a∗, x , y , z}. There are two cases: (i) a∗ ∈ C \ B; and, (ii) a∗ ∈ B ∩ C .
(i) By Claim 16(i), (B,C ) = (b, {a∗, x , y , z} \ b) with b 6= a∗. By Claim 6, this is a contradiction: if b = x , then z
is marginal for Z ; if b = y , then y is not marginal for Z ; and, if b = z , then z is not marginal for Y .
(ii) Since a∗ and z are marginal for Y , v(Pa∗yz ,Y ) = y . There are two cases: (a) z ∈ C \ B; and, (b) z ∈ B ∩ C .
(a) There are two sub-cases: y ∈ B \ C ; and, y ∈ C . In the first case, ({a∗, z}, {a∗, y}) splits Y by Claim 6. So, z
is not marginal for Y , a contradiction. In the second case, v(Pa∗yz ,Y ) = v(Pa∗yz , {v(Pa∗yz ,B ∩ Y ), v(Pa∗yz ,Y )}) =
v(Pa∗yz , {a∗, y}) = a∗ 6= y by Claim 6, a contradiction. (b) In this case, (B,C ) = ({a∗, y , z}, {a∗, x , z}). By Claim 6,
({y , z}, {x , z}) splits Z . So, y is not marginal for Z , which is a contradiction.
To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for |Y ∪Z | = n and consider the case |Y ∪Z | = n+1. By M and
Claim 15, Y and Z each have one or two marginal alternatives. If both have two, this reduces to the case |Y ∪Z | = n by
Claim 14. (Without loss of generality, |Y | ≥ 4. So, Y must contain some non-marginal alternative that is not marginal
in Z .) If both sets have one marginal alternative, then either y or z is marginal for Y ∪ Z by M and Claims 14-15. So,
either y is marginal for Y or z is marginal for Z by Claim 14, both contradictions. So, suppose a∗ and z are marginal
for Y ; and, y is marginal for Z . By M and Claim 14, a∗ /∈ Z is the only marginal alternative in Y ∪ Z . By Claim 14:
a∗ and z are marginal for {a∗, y , z}; and, y is marginal for {x , y , z} for any x ∈ Z .
Now, consider the splitting (B,C ) of Z∗ ≡ Z ∪ a∗. There are two cases: (i) (B,C ) = (b,Z∗ \ b) with b 6= a∗; and,
(ii) a∗ ∈ B ∩ C . For both, y and z must appear in the same sub-issues as a∗. (i) By the argument in (i) of the base
case, b 6= y , z . So, {y , z} ⊆ C as claimed. (ii) By the argument in (ii)(a) of the base case, z ∈ B ∩ C . In turn, this
implies y ∈ B ∩ C . To see why, suppose y ∈ B \ C and fix some x ∈ C \ B. Then, ({y , z}, {x , z}) splits {x , y , z} by
Claim 6. By the argument in (ii)(b) of the base case, this is a contradiction. So, {y , z} ⊆ B ∩ C as claimed.
Continuing in this vein on the sub-issues B and C , y and z always appear in the same sub-issues (up to the splitting
of {a∗, y , z}). Accordingly, y and z appear in exactly the same subgames of SvZ∗|Z (i.e., SvZ∗ after a∗ is pruned). By
assumption, v(P,Z ) = y for some profile P where y is not the Condorcet winner in Z . Since SvZ∗ implements v on Z
∗
by Theorem 1, v(P,Z ) = UNE [SvZ∗|Z ;P] = y . To see the contradiction, consider the profile P
σ that permutes z and y
in every voter’s preference. From the symmetry of SvZ∗|Z , v(P
σ,Z ) = UNE [SvZ∗|Z ;P
σ] = z . But, this contradicts that
z is marginal for Z and establishes that v is asymmetric.
Claim 18 If v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then %v defines a priority.
Proof. Given Claim 17, it suffices to show that: (i) the indifference classes of %v contain one or two alternatives; and,
(ii) %v is transitive. (i) By way of contradiction, suppose x ∼v y ∼v z . By M, {x , y , z} has a marginal alternative. By
definition of ∼v , it follows that {x , y , z} has three marginal alternatives, which contradicts Claim 15. (ii) Given (i), it
suffices to rule out the possibility that x %v y v z v x . Since v is asymmetric (by Claim 17) and {x , y , z} has a
marginal alternative (by M), this leads to a contradiction along the lines of (i).
Proof of Lemma 1. Claim 18 establishes (i). To establish (ii), fix an issue A. By M, some x ∈ A is marginal. Let
z ∈ min%v A and y ≡ min%v A \ z . If x ∈ A \ {y , z}, one obtains a contradiction along the lines of Claim 18.
(b) Proof of Corollary 1 – Revealed Priority via Condorcet Triples
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Claim 19 Suppose v satisfies IS, ILA, and M. If v (B,C ) splits A /∈ X1 and |C \ B| ≥ 2, then |B \ C | = 1.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose |C \ B|, |B \ C | ≥ 2. Fix any b, b′ ∈ B \ C and c , c ′ ∈ C \ B. By Claim
6, ({b, b′}, {c , c ′}) splits A′ ≡ {b, b′, c , c ′}. Given this splitting, there exists some profile Pa where a ∈ A′ is not the
Condorcet winner such that v(Pa,A′) = a. So, A′ has no marginal alternatives, which contradicts M.
For a weak ordering % on X , let ∗ denote any linear ordering such that y  z implies y ∗ z for all y , z ∈ X . Given
an issue A = {a1, ..., aK} ∈ X labeled according to ∗ (i.e., ai ∗ ak if i < k), let
Akj ≡
{aj , ..., ak} if j ≤ k ≤ K∅ otherwise.
Claim 20 Suppose v satisfies IS, ILA, and M. If A = {a1, ..., aK} is labeled according to ∗v for K ≥ 2, then:
(a1 ∪ AKj ,AK2 ) splits A for some j such that j ∈ {3, ...,K + 1}.
Proof. By Claim 16(i) and Lemma 1, there are two possibilities for the splitting (B,C ) of A: (i) (B,C ) = (b,A \ b)
with b 6= aK ; or, (ii) aK ∈ B ∩ C . In either case, I show that (B,C ) has the desired structure.
(i) I show b = a1. By way of contradiction, suppose b = ak for some k 6= 1,K . Then, v(PaK ak a1 , {a1, ak , aK}) = ak
by Claim 6 so that ak v a1 by Lemma 1. Since a1 %v ak by assumption, ak v a1 contradicts the fact that %v is a
weak ordering (by Claim 17). So, b = a1 as required.
(ii) By Claim 19, there are two possibilities: (1) (B,C ) = (A \ c ,A \ b); and, (2) (B,C ) = (b ∪ B ′,A \ b) for
B ′ ⊂ A\b and |A\B ′| ≥ 3. (1) It suffices to show b = a1 and c = a2. If a1 6= b, c , then the outcomes on {a1, b, c} lead
to the contradictions b, c v a1 following the same kind of reasoning as in case (i). So, b = a1 without loss of generality.
If a2 6= c , then the outcomes on {a1, a2, c} lead to the contradiction c v a2. So, c = a2. (2) It suffices to show: (a)
b = a1; (b) a2 /∈ B ′; and, (c) ak ∈ B ′ implies ak+1 ∈ B ′. (a) By the same reasoning as (1), a1 /∈ B ∩C = B ′. If a1 6= b,
then {a1, b, c} leads to the contradiction b v a1 for c /∈ b ∪ B ′. So, b = a1. (b) If a2 ∈ B ′, then {a1, a2, c} leads to
the contradiction c v a2 for c /∈ a1 ∪ B ′ given (a). So, a2 /∈ B ′. (c) If ak ∈ B ′ and ak+1 /∈ B ′, then {a1, ak , ak+1}
leads to the contradiction ak+1 v ak given (a).
Corollary 1 If v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then:
(i) y v z if and only if there exists an x ∈ X such that v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y ; and,
(ii) y ∼v z if and only if, for every x ∈ X \ {y , z},

v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = z and v(Pxzy , {x , y , z}) = y
or
v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = x and v(Pxzy , {x , y , z}) = x
.
Proof. (i) (⇐) From Table 1, there are six different potential splittings of {x , y , z}. For each, v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y
implies v(Pxzy , {x , y , z}) ∈ {x , y}. This establishes that z is marginal for {x , y , z} and y is not. So, y v z .
(⇒) For |X | = 3, the claim is trivial. The claim is also trivial if |X | ≥ 4 and: (a) y %v x % z for some x ∈ X \{y , z};
or, (b) z and w are marginal for some Y such that y ∈ Y . (a) By Lemma 1, y cannot be marginal for {x , y , z}. Then,
v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y from Table 1. (b) By Claim 14, z and w are marginal for {y , z ,w}. So, y cannot be marginal
for {x , y , z} by Claim 15. Then, v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y from Table 1.
So, suppose |X | ≥ 4 and conditions (a)-(b) do not hold. By way of contradiction, suppose v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) ∈ {x , z}
for all x ∈ X . Now, fix an A ≡ {x , x ′, y , z} where x , x ′ v y ; and, consider the splitting (B,C ). By Claim 20
(B,C ) = (x ∪ B ′, {x ′, y , z}) for B ′ ⊆ {y , z} (where y ∈ B ′ implies z ∈ B ′). If z ∈ B ′ and y /∈ B ′, then ({x , z}, {y , z})
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splits {x , y , z} by Claim 6. So, v(Pxyz , {x , y , z}) = y , a contradiction. Thus, B ′ = ∅ or B ′ = {y , z}. In the first case:
v(Pxx′y , {x , x ′, y}) = x = v(Pxx′z , {x , x ′, z}) and v(Px′xy , {x , x ′, y}) = x = v(Px′xz , {x , x ′, z}). In the second case:
v(Pxx′y , {x , x ′, y}) = x ′ = v(Pxx′z , {x , x ′, z}) and v(Px′xy , {x , x ′, y}) = x = v(Px′xz , {x , x ′, z}).
To complete the proof, consider the agenda SvU on U ≡ {x : x v y} ∪ {y , z}. From the observations in the
previous paragraph, y and z must appear in the same subgames of SvU . By assumption, there is some Y ⊆ X that leads
to the inference y v z . Since conditions (a)-(b) do not hold, Lemma 1 implies that Y ⊆ U. Then, a contradiction
obtains by the symmetry argument given at the end of Claim 17. In particular, v(P,Y ) = UNE [SvU|Z ;P] 6= z iff
v(Pσ,Y ) = UNE [SvU|Z ;P
σ] 6= y . Since z is marginal on Y , it follows that y is marginal on Y .
(ii) The result follows from (i), the potential splittings of {x , y , z}, and the fact that %v is a weak ordering.
(c) Proof of Lemma 2 – The Revealed Amendment Rule
Definition 14 Given a decision rule v with revealed priority %v , x ∈ X is revealed to amend b ∈ X if:
(1) b v x ; and, (2) v(Pxbc , {b, c , x}) = c for all c ∈ X such that b %v c v x .
Then, define αv as follows: b ∈ αv (x) if x is revealed to amend b and x is not revealed to amend any a v b.
Lemma 2 If v satisfies IS, ILA, and M, then (%v ,αv ) defines an admissible pair.
Proof. It suffices to check that (%v ,αv ) is admissible.
(i) if z ∈ X1, then α(z) = ∅: By Definition 14.
(ii) if z ∈ Xj for j 6= 1, then α(z) ⊆ Xk for some k < j : By Definition 14, it suffices to check that z amends some
alternative. By Lemma 2, there are two possibilities: a unique b has immediately higher priority than z ; or, distinct b
and c have immediately higher priority than z . In the first case, b v z implies that z amends b (since (2) is vacuous).
In the second, b ∼v c v z implies v(Pzbc , {b, c , z}) = c by Corollary 1. So, again, z amends b.
(iii) if z , z ′ ∈ Xj for j 6= 1, then α(z) = α(z ′): By Definition 14, it suffices to show that z ′ is revealed to amend b if
z is revealed to amend b. By way of contradiction, suppose: z is revealed to amend b; and, z ′ is not. By Definition 14,
there exists some c such that b %v c v z ′ ∼v z and v(Pz′bc , {b, c , z ′}) 6= c . By Corollary 1, v(Pz′bc , {b, c , z ′}) 6= z ′.
Otherwise, z ′ v b which contradicts that %v is a weak ordering (by Claim 17). So, v(Pz′bc , {b, c , y}) = b. By
Corollary 1, b v c . Since z is revealed to amend b, Definition 14 implies v(Pzbc , {b, c , z}) = c . To summarize,
v(Pzbc , {b, c , z}) = c and v(Pz′bc , {b, c , z}) = b for some c such that b v c v z ′ ∼v z .
By Claim 20, the splitting of {b, c , z , z ′} is (b ∪ B ′, {c , z , z ′}) for B ′ ⊆ {z , z ′}. By Claim 6, v(Pzbc , {b, c , z}) = c
implies z ∈ B ′ and v(Pz′bc , {b, c , z ′}) = b implies y /∈ B ′. So, the splitting of {b, c , z , z ′} is ({b, z}, {c , z , z ′}). By
Claim 6, this implies v(Pbz′z , {b, z , z ′}) = y so that z ′ v z by Corollary 1, which is a contradiction.
(iv) if z ∈ Xj+1 and |Xj | = 2, then α(z) = Xj or α(z) ⊆ Xk for some k < j : By Definition 14 and (i) above.
(d) Proof of Sufficiency
Note: In this section, I refer to a node q of a priority (resp. simple) agenda PrX (resp. SX ) by its label `(q).
For a weak ordering % on X , let L%(a) ≡ {x ∈ X : a  x} denote the strict lower contour set of a ∈ X .
Claim 21 Fix a priority agenda Pr(%,α) and a non-terminal node A = {a1, ..., aK} labeled according to ∗.
Then, the successors of A are a1 ∪ AKj and AK2 for some j ∈ {3, ...,K + 1}. What is more:
(i) AK2 = X mm−K+2 where X = {x1, ..., xm} is labeled according to ∗; and,
(ii) a2  aj and aj is a highest priority alternative in AK3 that amends a1 (if such an alternative exists).
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Proof. Let B and C denote the the two successors of node A in Pr(%,α). Since % is a priority, there are two cases: (1)
max% A = {a1, a2}; or, (2) max% A = {a1}. Since the claim is trivial if |A| = 2, suppose |A| ≥ 3.
(1) By construction (step (ii) in Class 3), a1 and a2 must have been added at A. Since they must be added to
different successors of A, a1 ∈ B \ C and a2 ∈ C \ B. By definition of α, the next highest priority alternative(s) in
X are added under the successors identified with a1 and a2. By a straightforward induction argument, it follows that
B = a1 ∪ L%(a1) and C = a2 ∪ L%(a2). So, B = a1 ∪ AK3 , C = AK2 = X mm−K+2, and a2  a3.
(2) By construction (step (i) in Class 3), a1 and the next highest priority alternative(s) at A must be added
to different successors of A. Letting A−1 ≡ max%(A \ a1), it follows that a1 ∈ B \ C and A−1 ⊆ C \ B. So,
C = A−1 ∪ L%(a2) = AK2 = X mm−K+2 by the same argument as (1). Similarly, B = a1 ∪AKj where aj is a highest priority
in C = AK2 = X
m
m−K+2 that amends a1 besides a2  aj (if such an alternative exists).
Proof of Theorem 2 (Sufficiency). Fix a decision rule v that satisfies IS, ILA, and M.
First, note that %v defines a priority (by Lemma 1) and αv defines an amendment rule consistent with %v (by
Lemma 2). So, (%v ,αv ) defines a priority agenda PrvX . By the sufficiency portion of Theorem 1, PrvX implements v if
PrvX = S
v
X . To establish this, I show that the successors at the root nodes of Pr
v
X and S
v
X coincide. Extending this line
of reasoning by a simple induction argument, it follows that PrvX = S
v
X .
To see that the successors at the (common) root X of PrvX and S
v
X coincide, label X = {x1, ..., xm} according to
∗v . By Claim 20, the successors of X in SvX are x1 ∪X mj and X m2 for some j such that j ∈ {3, ...,m +1}. There are two
cases to consider: (i) j = m + 1 (so that X mj = ∅); and, (ii) j ∈ {3, ...,m} (so that X mj 6= ∅).
In both cases, the fact that the successors of X on PrvX coincide with the successors on S
v
X follows from Claim 21:
(i) Claim 6 applied to (x1,X m2 ) gives v(Pxj x1c , {x1, xj , c}) = x1 for all xj , c such that x1 %v c v xj . So, no xj such that
x2 v xj is revealed to amend x1 (by Definition 14). (ii) Claim 6 applied to (x1∪X mj ,X m2 ) gives v(Pxj xk x1 , {x1, xk , xj}) = x1
and v(Pxj x1xk , {x1, xk , xj}) = xk for xk ∈ X j−12 . So, xk v xj (by Corollary 1) and xj is revealed to amend x1. To see that
no xk such that x2 v xk v xj is revealed to amend x1, observe that v(Pxk x1x2 , {x1, x2, xk}) = x1 for all xk ∈ X j−13 .
9.6.2 Necessity of IS, ILA, and M
Note: In this section, I abuse notation by referring to a node q of a priority agenda by its label `(q).
Claim 22 Fix a priority agenda Pr(%,α) on X = {x1, ..., xm} (labeled according to ∗) such that xj amends x1 and x2
(according to α). Then, every path from X to a terminal node passes through a non-terminal node with a successor X mj .
Proof. The proof is by strong induction on |X | ≡ m. The base case m = 3 is trivial.
To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n + 1. By Claim 21, the
two successors of the root X are x1∪X mk and X m2 for k ∈ {3, ...,m+1}. Moreover, k 6= m+1. Otherwise, no alternative
amends x1 and x2. Since path from X to a terminal node passes through x1 ∪ X mk or X m2 , it suffices to show that every
path from x1 ∪X mk or X m2 to a terminal node passes through a non-terminal node with the desired characteristics. There
are three cases to consider: (i) j = k = 3; (ii) j = k > 3; and, (iii) j ∈ {k + 1, ...,m}.
(i) By Claim 21, X m3 is a successor of x1 ∪ X m3 and X m2 , making these the nodes with the desired characteristics.
(ii) By the same reasoning as case (i), every path from x1 ∪ X mk to a terminal node passes through a non-terminal
node with the desired characteristics. Next, consider X m2 . By definition of α and the assumption that xj amends x1 and
x2, it follows that xj also amends x3. By construction, PrX (X m2 ) is a priority agenda on n or fewer alternatives where xj
amends the two top-priority alternatives. By the induction hypothesis, every path from X m2 to a terminal node passes
through a non-terminal node with the desired characteristics.
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(iii) As in case (ii), xj amends x3. So, xj also amends xk by definition of α. As in case (ii), every path from X m2 to
a terminal node passes through a non-terminal node with the desired characteristics. By similar reasoning, every path
from x1 ∪ X mk to a terminal node also passes through a non-terminal node with the desired characteristics.
Claim 23 Every priority agenda is persistent.
Proof. The proof is by strong induction on |X | ≡ m. The base cases m = 2, 3 are straightforward. To complete the
induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n + 1.
Fix a priority agenda PrX defined by (%,α); and, label X = {x1, ..., xm} according to ∗. By Claim 21, the two
successors of the root X are x1 ∪ X mk and X m2 for k ∈ {3, ...,m + 1}. By construction, PrX (x1 ∪ X mk ) and PrX (X m2 ) are
priority agendas on n or fewer alternatives. From the induction hypothesis, it follows that these agendas are persistent.
So, PrX is persistent at every non-terminal node except possibly X . To check persistence at X , there are two cases to
consider: (i) k ∈ {3, ...,m}; and, (ii) k = m + 1.
(i) The uncontested alternatives at X are X mk . By definition, xk amends x1 and x2. By Claim 22, it then follows
that every path from X to a terminal node in PrX passes through a non-terminal node with successor X mk . So, PrX is
persistent at X . (ii) There are no uncontested alternatives at X . So, PrX is trivially persistent at X .
Proof of Remark 4. (i) History-independence follows by construction; and, persistence by Claim 23.
(ii) By way of contradiction, suppose that the right-hand agenda in Example 3 is a priority agenda. (In fact, the
argument is identical for the left-hand agenda.) Since each only appears at one terminal node, x1 and x2 must have the
highest priority (requirement (i) of admissibility). Since x3 and x4 amend different alternatives, they cannot have equal
priority (requirement (iii) of admissibility). From these two observations, x3 and x4 must then have consecutive priority.
But this is a contradiction (requirement (ii) of admissibility): x3 does not amend x4; and, x4 does not amend x3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose PrX implements v where PrX is defined by (%,α) and X = {x1, ..., xm} is labeled
according to ∗. To establish the result, it suffices to show that xm is marginal for X . By Remark 1, it then follows
that xm is marginal for any issue A ⊆ X such that xm ∈ A. Since the pruned agenda PrX |{x1,...,xm−1} is a priority agenda
on X \ xm such that x % xm−1 for all x ∈ X \ xm, the same argument establishes that xm−1 is marginal for any issue
A ⊆ X \ xm such that xm−1 ∈ A. By progressively deleting the highest index alternative (among those remaining) and
repeating this argument, it follows that there exists a marginal alternative for all A ∈ X−1.
The proof that xm is marginal for X = {x1, ..., xm} is by strong induction on |X | ≡ m. The base cases m = 2, 3 are
trivial. To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and consider the case m = n + 1. By Claim 21,
the successors of the root X are x1 ∪ X mk and X m2 . There are two cases: (i) k = m + 1; and, (ii) k ∈ {3, ...,m}.
(i) By construction, the root splits PrX into x1 and a priority agenda PrX (X m2 ) on n alternatives. Since xi % xm for
all xi ∈ X m2 , the induction hypothesis implies UNE [PrX (X m2 );P] = xm only if xm is the Condorcet winner on (P,X m2 ).
Then, “backward induction” implies that UNE [PrX ;P] = xm only if xm is the Condorcet winner on (P, {x1, xm}) as well.
Combining the last two observations gives the result.
(ii) By construction, the agendas PrX (x1 ∪ X mk ) and PrX (X m2 ) are priority agendas on n or fewer alternatives. By
Claim 11, UNE [PrX ;P] = xm only if UNE [PrX (x1 ∪ X mk );P] = xm and UNE [PrX (X m2 );P] = xm. Since xi % xm for all
xi ∈ X , the induction hypothesis implies that this is the case only if xm is the Condorcet winner on (P, x1 ∪ X mk ) and
(P,X m2 ). Combining the last two observations gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Necessity). Fix a decision rule v implemented by a priority agenda PrX . Given Remark 4, the
necessity portion of Theorem 1 establishes that v satisfies IS and ILA. Moreover, v satisfies M by Proposition 3.
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9.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Note: In this section, I abuse notation by referring to a node q of a priority agenda PrX by its label `(q).
Suppose PrX is defined by (%,α) where X = {x1, ..., xm} is labeled according to ∗. The proof is by strong induction
on |X | ≡ m. The base cases m = 2, 3 are trivial. To complete the induction, suppose the claim holds for m ≤ n and
consider the case m = n + 1.
Fix a profile P such that UNE [PrX ;P] = xk . (Where xk−1 ∼ xk , suppose that every alternative that amends xk−1
also amends xk .) By Claim 21, the successors of the root X are: B ≡ x1∪X mj for some j ∈ {3, ...,m+1}; and, C ≡ X m2 .
So, there are four cases to consider: (i) k ∈ {j +1, ...,m}; (ii) k ∈ {3, ..., j−1}; (iii) k = j ; and, (iv) k = 2. To establish
the result, I show that UNE [PrkX ;P] = xk in each case (where Pr
k
X ≡ PrxkX to simplify the notation):
(i) Since xk ∈ B ∩ C and UNE [PrX ;P] = xk , Claim 11 implies UNE [PrX (B);P] = UNE [PrX (C );P] = xk .
Since PrX (B) and PrX (C ) are priority agendas on n or fewer alternatives and k 6= j , the induction hypothesis implies
UNE [PrkX (B);P] = UNE [Pr
k
X (C );P] = xk . So, UNE [Pr
k
X ;P] = xk as required.
(ii) Since xk /∈ B and UNE [PrX ;P] = xk , “backward induction” implies UNE [PrX (C );P] = xk . Since PrX (C ) is a
priority agenda on n or fewer alternatives, the induction hypothesis implies UNE [PrkX (C );P] = UNE [PrX (C );P] = xk .
Since xk /∈ B, PrkX (B) = PrX (B). So, “backward induction” implies UNE [PrkX ;P] = xk as required.
(iii) By the same reasoning as in case (i), UNE [PrX (B);P] = UNE [PrX (C );P] = xj and UNE [PrkX (C );P] = xj . By
way of contradiction, suppose UNE [PrkX ;P] 6= xj . Then, UNE [PrkX ;P] = x1 by Claim 11. Since UNE [PrkX (C );P] = xj ,
“backward induction” implies that x1MPX xj .
Since UNE [PrkX ;P] = x1, “backward induction” implies UNE [Pr
k
X (Bj);P] = x1 where Bj ≡ {x1, xj−1} ∪ X mj+1 is
the “left” successor of the root X in PrkX . Since the agenda at the “left” successors B
′ ≡ x1 ∪ X mj′ of B and Bj
coincide and UNE [PrkX (Bj);P] = x1, “backward induction” implies UNE [Pr
k
X (B
′);P] = UNE [PrX (B ′);P] = x1. Since
UNE [PrX (B);P] = xj however, “backward induction” implies that xj MPX x1. Since this contradicts the inference x1M
P
X xj
drawn in the last paragraph, UNE [PrkX ;P] = xj .
(iv) This case is similar to (iii) but more involved. Since UNE [PrX ;P] = x2 and x2 /∈ B, “backward induction”
implies UNE [PrX (C );P] = x2. Let B ′ ≡ x2 ∪ X mj′ and C ′ ≡ X m3 denote the successors of C in PrX . Since x2 only
appears once below B ′, it is majority preferred to UNE [PrX (C ′);P] and every alternative it meets along the “backward
induction” path in PrX (B ′). Now, consider the re-prioritized agenda Pr2X , letting B2 ≡ x2 ∪ X mj and C2 ≡ x1 ∪ X m3
denote the successors of X . By construction, B ′2 ≡ x1 ∪ X mj′ and C ′2 ≡ C ′ are the successors of C2 in Pr2X .
Since every alternative that amends x1 in PrX also amends x2, everything that x2 meets along the “backward induction
path” in PrX (B2) is an alternative that it meets in PrX (B ′). Since x2 is majority preferred to all of these alternatives by
the first observation in the last paragraph, UNE [Pr2X (B2);P] = x2. Moreover, UNE [Pr
2
X (C
′
2);P] = UNE [PrX (C
′);P]
by the second observation in the last paragraph.
By way of contradiction, suppose UNE [Pr2X ;P] 6= x2. Since UNE [Pr2X (B2);P] = x2 and x2MPX UNE [Pr2X (C ′2);P] =
UNE [PrX (C
′);P], “backward induction” implies UNE [Pr2X ;P] = UNE [Pr
2
X (B
′
2);P]. Since x2 is majority preferred to
everything that x1 meets along the “backward induction” path in PrX (B ′2), UNE [Pr
2
X ;P] = UNE [Pr
2
X (B
′
2);P] = x1.
Since UNE [Pr2X (B2);P] = x2, x1M
P
X x2.
Since UNE [Pr2X (B
′
2);P] = x1, the same reasoning as above establishes UNE [PrX (B);P] = x1. Since UNE [PrX ;P] =
x2 however, x2MPX x1. Since this contradicts the last paragraph, UNE [Pr
2
X ;P] = x2.
9.8 Proof of Proposition 5 and Theorem 3
Definition 15 A sequence 〈a〉 ≡ a1, ..., an is universal for x ∈ A on (P,A) if:
(1) every alternative in A appears exactly once in 〈a〉;
41
(2) 〈a〉 contains an MPA -transitive subsequence 〈b〉 ≡ b1, ..., bm such that x = b1; and,
(3) every alternative ai ∈ 〈a〉 \ 〈b〉 satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) ai appears before some alternative b ∈ 〈b〉 in the sequence 〈a〉; and,
(ii) bj MPA ai for the first bj ∈ 〈b〉 after ai in the sequence 〈a〉.
Claim 24 A sequence 〈a〉 in A is universal on (P,A) for at most one alternative in A.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose 〈a〉 = a1, ..., an is universal for distinct alternatives ai and aj . Without loss of
generality, suppose i < j . Let 〈bi 〉 and 〈bj〉 denote the transitive subsequences associated with ai and aj , respectively.
By condition (3.i), bi1 = ai and b
j
1 = aj . So, ai /∈ 〈bj〉. Hence, aj MPA ai by condition (3.ii). Since 〈bi 〉 is a transitive
sequence with ai maximal by condition (2), aj MPA ai implies aj /∈ 〈bi 〉.
By condition (3.ii), aj /∈ 〈bi 〉 implies b˜i MPA aj for some b˜i ∈ 〈bi 〉 such that b˜i = ak(i) and k(i) > j . Since 〈bj〉 is
a transitive subsequence by condition (2), b˜i MPA aj implies b˜
i /∈ 〈bj〉. By condition (3.ii), b˜i /∈ 〈bj〉 implies b˜j MPA b˜i for
some b˜j ∈ 〈bj〉 such that b˜j = ak(j) and k(j) > k(i). Since 〈bi 〉 is a transitive subsequence by condition (2), b˜j MPA b˜i
implies b˜j /∈ 〈bi 〉. Continuing in this vein leads to the contradiction that 〈a〉 does not terminate.
Claim 25 There exists a universal sequence for x on (P,A) iff x ∈ BA(MPA ).
Proof. (⇒) Fix some y ∈ A \BA(MPA ). By way of contradiction, suppose 〈a〉 is universal for y on (P,A). Consider the
transitive subsequence 〈b〉 = b1, ..., bm with b1 = y . Since y ∈ A \ BA(MPA ), 〈b〉 is not a maximal transitive sequence.
In other words, there exists some a ∈ A \ 〈b〉 such that a, b1, ..., bm is a transitive sequence. So, there exists no bj ∈ 〈b〉
such that bj MPA a. Since a must appear before some bj ∈ 〈b〉 by condition (3.i), this contradicts condition (3.ii). In
particular, no bj ∈ 〈b〉 may comes after a in 〈a〉. (⇐) Since x ∈ BA(MPA ), there exists a maximal transitive sequence
〈b〉 in A with b1 = x . For every a ∈ A \ 〈b〉, there exists some b ∈ 〈b〉 such that bMPA a. Otherwise, a, b1, ..., bm is
a transitive sequence, which contradicts the maximality of 〈b〉. Let bi(a) denote the last alternative in 〈b〉 such that
bi(a)M
P
A a. Extend 〈b〉 into a sequence 〈a〉 on A by inserting each a ∈ A \ 〈b〉 between the alternatives bi(a)−1 and bi(a).
By construction, 〈a〉 satisfies conditions (1)-(3). So, 〈a〉 is a universal sequence for x on (P,A).
Given a priority agenda PrA on A defined by (%,α), define a strict ordering ∗ from %. Let 〈a〉∗ = a∗1 , ..., a∗n denote the
sequence defined by taking the alternatives in A in the order associated with ∗. Given another sequence 〈a〉 = a1, ..., an
of the alternatives in A, define the permutation σ∗〈a〉 : A→ A by σ∗〈a〉(ai ) = a∗i . To simplify the notation, let Pr〈a〉A ≡ Pr
σ∗〈a〉
A
denote the agenda where the i th alternative in the sequence 〈a〉 occupies the i th highest priority position in the agenda.
Claim 26 Given a priority agenda PrA on A and a universal sequence 〈a〉 for x on (P,A), UNE [Pr〈a〉A ;P] = x .
Proof. The proof is by strong induction on |A|. The base case |A| = 2 is trivial. To complete the induction, suppose
the claim holds for |A| = n and consider the case |A| = n + 1. Fix a universal sequence 〈a〉 for x on (P,A). By Claim
24, 〈a〉 is not universal for any other alternative on (P,A). By definition, 〈a〉 contains a transitive subsequence 〈b〉
satisfying conditions (2)-(3) with x = b1. Given Claim 21, let C ≡ a1 ∪ An+1k and C ′ ≡ An+12 for 2 < k < n + 2 denote
the successors of the root node in Pr〈a〉A ; and, let 〈c〉 and 〈c ′〉 denote the subsequences of 〈a〉 associated with C and C ′.
There are three cases to consider for x = b1: (i) x ∈ C \ C ′; (ii) x ∈ C ∩ C ′; and, (iii) x ∈ C ′ \ C .
(i) Since C \ C ′ = {a1}, x = a1. It is easy to verify that 〈c〉 = x , ak , ..., an+1 is universal for x on (P,C ). Since
the last alternative in 〈a〉 must be in 〈b〉 by condition (3.i), it is also easy to verify that 〈c ′〉 = a2, ..., b2, ..., an+1
is universal for b2 on (P,C ′). Since Pr
〈a〉
A (C ) and Pr
〈a〉
A (C
′) are both priority agendas, UNE [Pr〈a〉A (C );P] = x and
UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A (C );P] = b2 by the induction hypothesis. Since xM
P
A b2 by construction, UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A ;P] = x .
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(ii) Since C ∩ C ′ = Ank , x = aj for some j ≥ k . As in case (i), it is easy to verify that 〈c〉 = a1, ak , ..., x , ..., an+1
is universal for x on (P,C ). Likewise, it is easy to verify that 〈c ′〉 = a2, ..., x , ..., an+1 is universal for x on (P,C ′). So,
UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A (C );P] = x = UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A (C
′);P] by the induction hypothesis, which implies UNE [Pr〈a〉A ;P] = x .
(iii) Since C ′ \C = Ak−12 , x = aj for some 2 ≤ j < k . As in case (ii), it is easy to verify that 〈c ′〉 = a2, ..., x , ..., an+1
is universal for x on (P,C ′). So, UNE [Pr〈a〉A (C
′);P] = x by the induction hypothesis. By way of contradiction, suppose
UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A ;P] 6= x . Since C \ C ′ = {a1}, Claim 11 implies UNE [Pr〈a〉A ;P] = a1. So, UNE [Pr〈a〉A (C );P] = a1. Since
UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A (C
′);P] = x , it follows that a1MPA x , which contradicts condition (3.ii).
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix a priority agenda PrA and a profile P on A. (i’) By McKelvey and Niemi’s [1978]
observation that no agenda can select an alternative outside the Top Cycle of (P,A), it follows that VΣ (PrA;P) ⊆
T C (MPA ). (ii’) Consider an x ∈ BA(MPA ). By Claim 25, there exists a universal sequence 〈a〉 for x on (P,A). Then,
UNE [Pr
〈a〉
A ;P] = x by Claim 26. So, x ∈ VΣ (PrA;P). Equivalently, BA(MPA ) ⊆ VΣ (PrA;P).
Claim 27 (i) If v satisfies IS and ILA and every A /∈ X1 ∪X2 has two marginal alternatives, then SvX is Euro-Latin. (ii)
If v satisfies IS and ILA and every A /∈ X1 ∪ X2 has one marginal alternative, then SvX is Anglo-American.
Proof. (i) Consider the splitting (B1,X1) of X and let a∗ denote a marginal alternative in X . By Claim 16(i), there
are two potential splittings: (1) a∗ ∈ B1 ∩ X1 with b1 ∈ B1 \ X1 and x1 ∈ X1 \ B1; and, (2) (B1,X1) = (b1,X \ b1).
For (1), Claim 6 implies that {a∗, b1, x1} has one marginal alternative a∗, a contradiction. So, the splitting must be (2).
Continuing in the same vein on X1 establishes that SvX is a Euro-Latin agenda.
(ii) Consider the splitting (B,C ) of X . If |C \B| ≥ 1 (with b ∈ B \C and c , c ′ ∈ C \B), then Claim 6 implies that
{b, c , c ′} has two marginal alternatives c and c ′, a contradiction. This shows that |C \B| = |B \C | = 1. In other words,
(B,C ) = (X \ c1,X \ b1) for some b1 ∈ B and c1 ∈ C . Continuing in the same vein on X \ c1 and X \ b1 establishes
that SvX is an Anglo-American agenda.
Proof of Theorem 3. Sufficiency: By Claim 27(i) above (resp. Claim 27(ii) above). Necessity: Theorem 1 ensures
that every decision rule implementable by Euro-Latin agenda (resp. Anglo-American agenda) satisfies IS and ILA. In
turn, it is easy to check that every decision rule implementable by Euro-Latin agenda (resp. Anglo-American agenda)
has two marginal alternatives (resp. a unique marginal alternative) for all A such that |A| 6= 1.
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10 Supplementary Appendix
10.1 Examples
Example 9 In Congress, a two-stage amendment agenda comes about when a substitute to the original bill (or an
amendment to the bill) is proposed. In that case, procedure requires voting to determine the features of the “original”
and “substitute” versions of the legislation before deciding whether either of these versions should replace the status quo.
When there is a bill b, a substitute b′, and amendments (a and a′) to each, for example, the sequence of questions is:
Q1. Should the amendment a to the original bill b be accepted?
Q2. Should the amendment a′ to the substitute bill b′ be accepted?
Q3. Should the substitute bill (as amended) be selected over the original bill (as amended)?
Q4. Should the surviving bill be selected over the status quo?
This leads to the agenda below where: x1 (resp. x3) represents b (resp. b′); x2 (resp. x4) represents b+a (resp. b′+a′);
and, x5 represents the status quo (see also Schwartz [2008, Figure 2]; and, Miller [1995, Figure 4]).
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}
{x1, x3, x4, x5}
{x1, x3, x5}
{x1, x5}
x1 x5
{x3, x5}
x3 x5
{x1, x4, x5}
{x1, x5}
x1 x5
{x4, x5}
x4 x5
{x2, x3, x4, x5}
{x2, x3, x5}
{x2, x5}
x2 x5
{x3, x5}
x3 x5
{x2, x4, x5}
{x2, x5}
x2 x5
{x4, x5}
x4 x5
Example 10 The following agendas show that the two structural features of recursive agendas are independent.
- Continuous and repetitive: Consider the right-hand agenda in Figure 5.
- Discontinuous and non-repetitive: Consider the two-stage amendment agenda depicted in Example 9.
Example 11 Up to permutation of the alternatives, there are fifteen recursive agendas for |X | = 4: the nine simple
agendas (see Example 3); the two agendas in Example 6; and, the four agendas depicted below.
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x3 {x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
x3 {x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x3 {x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x4}
x2 x4
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
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{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x3 {x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
x4 {x2, x3}
x2 x3
{x1, x2, x3, x4}
{x1, x3, x4}
x3 {x1, x4}
x1 x4
{x2, x3, x4}
{x2, x3}
x2 x3
{x3, x4}
x3 x4
Example 12 The following example show that recursive agendas can violate one or both properties of simple agendas.
- History-dependent and persistent: Following Remark 3, consider the left-hand agenda in Figure 5.
- History-independent and non-persistent: Consider the left-hand agenda in Example 6. It is easy to check that
this agenda is recursive. Since the labels of the non-terminal nodes are distinct, it is also history-independent. However,
it is not persistent: no node between the root r and the terminal node labeled x2 has a successor labeled u(r) = x4.
- History-dependent and non-persistent: Starting with the left-hand agenda in Example 6, replace the left (resp.
right) terminal node labeled x4 with the agenda under the left (resp. right) node labeled {x , b, c} in Figure 5. The
resulting agenda on six alternatives is recursive; but, it clearly violates both properties of simple agendas.
Example 13 The right-hand agenda in Example 2 admits “strict” and “weak” priority representations:
Representation Priority % Amendment Rule α
strict x1  x2  x3  x4 α(xi ) =
 x1 for i = 2, 3x2 for i = 4
weak x1 ∼ x2  x3  x4 α(xi ) =
 {x1, x2} for i = 3x2 for i = 4
Although x1 and x2 are not symmetric alternatives, they have equal priority in the “weak” representation.
Example 14 Consider the following extension of the right-hand agenda in Example 2:
{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}
{x1, x3, x4, x5}
{x1, x5}
x1 x5
{x3, x4, x5}
{x3, x5}
x3 x5
{x4, x5}
x4 x5
{x2, x3, x4, x5}
{x2, x4, x5}
x2 {x4, x5}
x4 x5
{x3, x4, x5}
{x3, x5}
x3 x5
{x4, x5}
x4 x5
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It is easy to see that this agenda is a priority agenda: starting from the weak representation in Example 13, simply define
x4  x5 and α(x5) = x1. However, there is no way to define both α(x4) and α(x5) when one assigns a strict priority
between x1 and x2. The problem is that x4 does not amend x1; and, x5 does not amend x2.
10.2 Independence of the Axioms
- IS and ILA but not M: The decision rule on X induced by the knockout agenda in Example 1 clearly satisfies IS and
ILA. To see that it violates M, note that x3 is the outcome for any profile P that gives the majority relation in Figure 9
below; but, x3 is not the Condorcet winner on (P,X ). By symmetry, there are profiles where each of the alternatives is
selected without being the Condorcet winner.
- ILA and M but not IS: The decision rule on A induced by the right-hand agenda TX |A in Figure 5 trivially satisfies
ILA. To see that it satisfies M, note that UNE [TX |A;P] = x only if x is the Condorcet winner on A. As shown in Example
4 however, it violates IS (because there is no way to split A).
- IS and M but not ILA: Consider the decision rule v3 on {x1, x2, x3} that selects: the majority preferred alternative
between x1 and x2 when both are available; xi on {xi , x3}; and, xi on {xi}. Since ({x1, x3}, {x2, x3}) splits {x1, x2, x3},
v3 satisfies IS. Since x3 is trivially marginal, v3 also satisfies M. To see that it violates ILA, consider a profile P3 where
x3 is the Condorcet winner on {x1, x2, x3}. If v3 satisfies ILA, then v3(P3, {x1, x2, x3}) = ... = x3. But, this contradicts
the assumption that v3(P3, {x1, x2, x3}) = v3(P3, {x1, x2}) 6= x3.
10.3 Connection to Apesteguia et al. [2014]
Sub-section (a) describes the formal connection while sub-section (b) establishes the proofs.
(a) Discussion
The following stipulates that a decision rule marginalizes the same number of alternatives for all issues of a given size.
Neutral Marginalization (NM) For each j , v marginalizes the same number of alternatives for all A ∈ Xj.
This property is sufficient to distinguish Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas from all other priority agendas:
Proposition 6 Among the decision rules implementable by priority agenda, the only ones that satisfy Neutral Marginal-
ization are the decision rules implementable by Euro-Latin agenda or Anglo-American agenda.
Given Theorem 2, this provides a joint characterization for Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas: a decision rule v
is implementable by one of these agendas if and only if it satisfies IS, ILA, M, and NM. For separate characterizations,
recall that each of these agenda types marginalizes the same number of alternatives for every issue of three or more
alternatives (see Section 6.2 of the paper). Given Proposition 6, Theorem 3 then follows immediately.
Apesteguia et al. also give separate characterizations of implementation by Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agenda.
Unlike Theorem 3, their approach emphasizes the differences between the resulting decision rules rather than the funda-
mental similarities. Specifically, they rely on the following two properties:
Condorcet Priority (CP) For each A /∈ X1 ∪X2, there exists a prioritarian alternative p∗ ∈ A such that, for every
Condorcet triple Pp∗xy involving alternatives x , y ∈ A, v(Pp∗xy , {p∗, x , y}) = p∗.
Condorcet Anti-Priority (CA) For each A /∈ X1 ∪ X2, there exists an anti-prioritarian alternative p∗ ∈ A such
that, for every Condorcet triple Pp∗xy involving alternatives x , y ∈ A, v(Pp∗xy , {p∗, x , y}) = y .
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To characterize the Euro-Latin rule, they require CP, ILA, and Division Consistency (DC) (see footnote 21). For the
Anglo-American rule, they require CA, ILA, and a property called Elimination Consistency (EC).
By Claim 28, CP marginalizes two alternatives for every issue (with three or more alternatives) while CA marginalizes
one. Given Corollary 3, this implies that one can replace DC and EC in their characterizations by IS:
Corollary 2 A decision rule v is implementable by:
(i) Euro-Latin agenda if and only if it satisfies IS, ILA, and CP;
(ii) Anglo-American agenda if and only if it satisfies IS, ILA, and CA.
Unlike Apesteguia et al., this result emphasizes the close connection between Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas.
(b) Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6. For the necessity of NM: See the necessity proof of Corollary 3.
For the sufficiency of NM: By Theorem 2, every decision rule implementable by priority agenda has a marginal
alternative on X . By Claim 15, there are two cases: (i) X has two marginal alternatives (denoted a∗1 and a
∗
2); or, (ii) X
has a unique marginal alternative. I show that SvX is Euro-Latin for (i) and Anglo-American for (ii).
(i) By Claim 27(i), it suffices to establish that all A such that |A| 6= 1 have two marginal alternatives. By Claim 14,
a∗1 and a
∗
2 are marginal for X \ x for all x 6= a∗1 , a∗2 . By NM, this implies that X \ y has two marginal alternatives for all
y ∈ X . Continuing in the same vein, the desired result follows by a simple inductive argument.
(ii) By Claim 27(ii), it suffices to establish that all A such that |A| 6= 2 have one marginal alternative. By way of
contradiction, suppose |X | ≥ 4 and some X \ x has two marginal alternatives. Then, by the argument in case (i), every
A 6= X such that |A| 6= 1 has two marginal alternatives. To establish the contradiction, consider the splitting (B1,X1)
of X . By the argument in Claim 27(i), SvX1 is Euro-Latin and (B1,X1) = (b1,X \ b1). This establishes that SvX is also
Euro-Latin. It then follows that X has two marginal alternatives, which is a contradiction.
Claim 28 Suppose v satisfies IS and ILA. (i) If v satisfies CP, then every A /∈ X1 ∪ X2 has two marginal alternatives.
(ii) If v satisfies CA, then every A /∈ X1 ∪X2 has a unique marginal alternative (the unique anti-prioritarian alternative).
Proof. The proof of (i) [resp. (ii)] is by induction on |X |. For |X | = 3, the claim follows from ILA and CP [resp. CA].
For the induction step, note that all A ⊂ X satisfy the claim by the induction hypothesis. To see that X also satisfies
the claim, consider the splitting (B,C ) of X . There are two possibilities for the prioritarian [resp. anti-prioritarian] p in
X : (a) p ∈ B ∩ C ; and, (b) p ∈ B \ C . I address these possibilities separately for (i) and (ii).
(i) Consider b ∈ B \ C and c ∈ C \ B. By Claim 6, (a) leads to the contradiction that p is not prioritarian in
{b, c , p} (let alone X ). So, (b) must hold. Using the same kind of reasoning, it can be shown that B = {p}. (The idea
is to suppose that there exists some b′ ∈ B \ p. Then, consider an issue {b′, c , p} such that c ∈ C \B. While there are
several cases, a contradiction obtains for each.) By the induction hypothesis, X \ p has two marginal alternatives. Since
the splitting of X is (p,X \ p), IS implies that these alternatives are marginal for X as well.
(ii) Consider b ∈ B and c ∈ C \ B. By Claim 6, (b) leads to the contradiction that p is not anti-prioritarian
in {b, c , p} (let alone X ). So, (a) must hold. By the induction hypothesis, p is marginal for B and C (since it is
anti-prioritarian for these issues). By IS, it then follows that p is marginal for X . Finally, by Claim 14 and the induction
hypothesis, there can be no other marginal alternative in X .
Proof of Corollary 2. For the class of Euro-Latin (resp. Anglo-American) agendas: (⇒) IS and ILA are necessary by
Theorem 2; and, CP (resp. CA) is necessary by Theorem 1 (resp. 2) of Apesteguia et al. (⇐) By Claims 27 and 28.
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10.4 Applications and Extensions
Proof of Remark 5. The agenda A in Example 9 is discontinuous. To see that it satisfies Preference Monotonicity,
first observe that the two sub-agendas A′ and A′′ below the root node are simple. So, A′ and A′′ satisfy Preference
Monotonicity by Proposition 1. Letting UNE [A;P] ≡ xi for i ∈ {1, ..., 5}, there are five cases to consider:
i = 1, 2: Without loss of generality, let i = 1 (since the reasoning for i = 2 is similar). Since x1 only appears in
one sub-agenda at the root (say A′), UNE [A′;P] = x1. By Preference Monotonicity of A′, UNE [S′;Px1↑] = x1. Since
UNE [A′′;P] = UNE [A′′;Pxi↑] as well, it then follows that UNE [A;Px1↑] = x1.
i = 3, 4: Without loss of generality, let i = 3 (since the reasoning for i = 4 is similar). Since x3 appears in both sub-
agendas at the root, there are two cases: (i) UNE [A′;P] = x3 = UNE [A′′;P]; and, (ii) UNE [A′;P] = x3 6= UNE [A′′;P].
(i) By Preference Monotonicity of A′ and A′′, UNE [A′;Px3↑] = x3 = UNE [A′′;Px3↑]. So, UNE [A;Px3↑] = x3.
(ii) Note that UNE [A′′({x1, x3, x5});P] = x3 so that x3MPA x5. Since A′′ is simple, UNE [A′′;P] = x2 (resp. x5)
implies UNE [A′′({x2, x3, x5});P] = x2 (resp. x5) by Claim 11. So, UNE [A′′;P] = x4. (If UNE [A′′;P] = x2, then
UNE [A′′({x2, x3, x5});P] = x2 so that x2MPA x3, which contradicts UNE [A;P] = x3. If UNE [A′′;P] = x5, then x5MPA x3,
which is a contradiction.)
Since UNE [A′′;P] = x4, UNE [A′′({x2, x4, x5});P] = x4. In turn, this implies UNE [A′′({x2, x3, x5});P] = x2 (since
x3M
P
A x4 and x5). So, x2M
P
A x3 and x2M
P
A x5. Consequently, UNE [A
′′({x2, x3, x5});Px3↑] = x3 (since x3MPA x5); and,
UNE [A′′;Px3↑] = x3 (since UNE [A′′({x2, x4, x5});Px3↑] = x4 and x3MPA x4). Since UNE [A′;Px3↑] = x3 by Preference
Monotonicity of A′, UNE [A;Px3↑] = x3.
i = 5: Since x5 is in every terminal sub-game, it must be the Condorcet winner on P. So, UNE [A;Px5↑] = x5.
Given a tournament MA, an alternative a covers another alternative b if: aMAb; and, for all c ∈ A\{a, b}, bMAc implies
aMAc . In turn, a subset B ⊆ A is A-uncovered if, for each a ∈ A \B, there exists a b ∈ B such that a does not cover b.
Definition 16 The Candidate Stable Set C S(MA) is the subset of alternatives in A that are at the top of some
uncovered MA-transitive chain. Formally, CS(MA) ≡ {x ∈ A : x = b1 for some A-uncovered MA-transitive chain 〈b〉}.
It is clear that a maximal MA-transitive chain 〈b〉 must be A-uncovered: for each a ∈ A \ 〈b〉, there exists a b ∈ 〈b〉 such
that bMAa. This shows that C S(MA) ⊇ BA(MA). Using the next definition, one can show much more:
Definition 17 The k-Dominating Set Dk(MA) is the subset of alternatives in A that beat every other alternative in
k steps or less. Formally, Dk(MA) ≡ {x ∈ A : x = b1MA...MAbn+1 = a with n ≤ k for each a ∈ A \ x}.
The tournament solution associated with k = 2 is called the Uncovered Set (i.e., UC (MA) ≡ D2(MA) for all A
and every tournament MA); and, the tournament solution associated with k = |A| − 1 is the Top Cycle. Proposition 6
of Dutta et al. [2002] establishes that UC (MA) ⊆ C S(MA) ⊆ D3(MA) for all A and every tournament MA.
Proof of Remark 6. Dutta et al. [2002] establish the following results: V˜Σ (AAA;P) = C S(MPA ) for every profile (P,A)
and Anglo-American agenda AAA (Proposition 5); and, V˜Σ (TA;P) ⊆ T C (MPA ) for every profile (P,A) and agenda TA
(Proposition 3). To complete the proof, it suffices to show that: (a) C S(MPA ) ⊆ V˜Σ (PA;P) for every profile (P,A) and
priority agenda PA; and, (b) T C (MPA ) ⊆ V˜Σ (ELA;P) for every profile (P,A) and Euro-Latin agenda ELA.
(a) Fix x ∈ C S(MPA ). Let 〈b〉 denote the associated A-uncovered MA-transitive chain; and, B the set of alternatives
in 〈b〉. Define B− ≡ {x ∈ A \ B : bMAx for some b ∈ B}. One can use 〈b〉 to construct a universal sequence 〈a−〉 for
x on A− ≡ B ∪ B− by inserting each a ∈ B− immediately before the last bi ∈ 〈b〉 such that bi MAa. To extend 〈a−〉
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into a sequence 〈a〉 on A, insert each a ∈ A+ ≡ A \ A− at the end of 〈a−〉.38 By Claim 26 (and the construction of
priority agendas), it follows that UNE [P〈a〉A|A− ;P] = UNE [P
〈a−〉
A− ;P] = x .
To establish the result, consider a candidate profile Pc such that, for each c ∈ A\ x , x c y for all y ∈ A\ c . I show
that A− is a Nash equilibrium of the first-stage entry game (P〈a〉A ;P,P
c). In other words, x ∈ E Q[P〈a〉A ;P,Pc ] so that
x ∈ V˜ (MPA ) as required. There are two cases: (i) c ∈ A−; and, (ii) c ∈ A+. (i) Since c = x has no incentive to exit,
suppose c ∈ A−\x . Since 〈a−〉\c is universal for x on A−\c , Theorem 2 and Claim 26 imply that UNE [P〈a〉A|A−\c ;P] = x .
So, c ∈ A− \ x has no incentive to exit. (ii) By construction, cMPA b for all b ∈ B. So, by definition of C S(MPA ), there
exists some b− ∈ B− such that b−MPA c . Since c has lowest priority on (P,A− ∪ c) but is not the Condorcet winner,
Theorem 2 implies that UNE [P〈a〉A|(A−∪c);P] 6= c . So, c ∈ A+ has no incentive to enter given Pc .
(b) Fix x ∈ T C (MPA ). Then, there is a sequence 〈a〉 = a1, ..., an such that a1 = x and ai MPA ai+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Clearly, UNE [EL〈a〉A ;P] = x . To establish the result, consider a candidate profile P
c such that, for each c ∈ A\x , x c y
for all y ∈ A \ c . Notice that UNE [EL〈a〉A|A\c ;P,Pc ] 6= c . So, c has no incentive to exit given Pc . So, A is a Nash
equilibrium of the first-stage entry game. In other words, x ∈ E Q[EL〈a〉A ;P,Pc ] so that x ∈ V˜ (MPA ) as required.
Proof of Remark 7. Fix a profile P on X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} that induces the following majority relation:
x1 x2
x4 x3MPX
Figure 9: The majority relation MPX induced by the profile P.
For this profile, the priority agendas (in Example 8) implement the following outcomes up to re-prioritization:
i Description Game Form PriX VΣ (Pr
i
X ;P) Tournament Solution
1 Euro-Latin (E-L) Figure 2, left X Top Cycle
2 E-L with intermediate amendment Example 2, left X Top Cycle
3 E-L with Anglo-American (A-A) amendment Figure 3, left X \ x4 Banks Set
4 A-A with E-L amendment Figure 3, right X \ x4 Banks Set
5 A-A with intermediate amendment Example 2, right X Top Cycle
6 A-A Figure 2, right X \ x4 Banks Set
Table 2: Discrimination by the six priority agendas on {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
For every majority relation not equivalent to MXP (up to permutation), each agenda in Table 2 can yield any outcome in
the Top Cycle. Consequently, Pr3X , Pr
4
X , and Pr
6
X are more discriminating than the other priority agendas.
In terms of bushiness, the priority agendas in Table 2 can be ordered as follows:
38It is worth pointing out that this sequence is different from the one Dutta et al. define in their proof of Proposition 5.
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Pr6XAAX Pr
5
X Pr
4
X
Pr3X Pr
2
X Pr
1
X ELX
Figure 10: Bushiness ordering of the priority agendas on X .
This shows that Pr5X is at once strictly bushier than Pr
3
X and Pr
4
X and strictly less discriminating.
Incidentally, the outcomes associated with the three remaining simple agendas (from Examples 1 and 3) are:
i Game Form SiX VΣ (S
i
X ;P) Tournament Solution
1 Example 1 {x2, x3} Copeland Set
2 Example 3, left X \ x4 Banks Set
3 Example 3, right X \ x4 Banks Set
Table 3: Discrimination by the remaining simple agendas on {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
As in the proof of Remark 7, the agendas in Table 3 implement the Top Cycle for any majority relation which is not a
four-cycle. So, the knockout agenda S1X is the most discriminating simple agenda on four alternatives.
Finally, the outcomes associated with the six remaining recursive agendas (from Examples 6 and 11) are:
i Game Form RiX VΣ (R
i
X ;P) Tournament Solution
1 Example 6, left X \ x4 Banks Set
2 Example 6, right X Top Cycle
3 Example 11, top left X \ x4 Banks Set
4 Example 11, top right X \ x4 Banks Set
5 Example 11, bottom left X \ x4 Banks Set
6 Example 11, bottom right X Top Cycle
Table 4: Discrimination by the remaining recursive agendas on {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
Since the agendas in Table 4 likewise implement the Top Cycle for any majority relation that does not include a four-cycle,
the knockout agenda is also the most discriminating recursive agenda on {x1, x2, x3, x4}.
Proof of Remark 8. Fix a collection of agendas T ; and, suppose two sub-collections T1, T2 ⊆ T satisfy Self-Consistency.
Then, it is straightforward to see that: T1, T2 ⊆ T1 ∪ T2 ⊆ T ; and, moreover, T1 ∪ T2 satisfies Self-Consistency.
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